The Mineral Silk Road

How India Must Lead the BRICS+ Charge on Critical Minerals

 

 

The global shift from a hydrocarbon-based energy paradigm to one centred on electrification and digitalisation has fundamentally altered the geography of geopolitical power. The digital and green transitions of the 21st century is not fueled by ideas alone; they are built on a bedrock of key critical minerals which fillip industrial and green growth.

 

Globally contested, these minerals are now the new currency of influence. As of 2026, the expanded BRICS+ bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa and new members Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and the UAE) sits atop a geological goldmine: it has significantly concentrated global mineral reserves under a single, albeit flexible, diplomatic framework.

 

Mineral Category	BRICS+ concentration	Key Member Contributors
Rare Earth Elements (REEs)	72%	China, Brazil, India, Russia
Manganese	75%	South Africa, Brazil, India
Graphite	50%	China, Brazil
Platinum Group Metals (PGMs)	~83% (Production)	South Africa, Russia
Nickel	28%	Indonesia, Russia, Brazil
Copper	10%	Iran, Russia, Brazil

Table 1: BRICS+ countries’ critical mineral reserves.^[1]

 

The expansion beyond the original five members has introduced new dimensions of mineral wealth and investment capacity: Argentina, part of the lithium triangle, has the world’s third-largest lithium reserves, and Egypt and Ethiopia hold lithium and other critical minerals. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, while not traditional mining giants, have shown policy intent by declaring mining as their third economic pillar, and transitioned into mineral financiers using their massive sovereign wealth funds to secure upstream assets in Africa and Latin America, alongside hosting phosphates and potential lithium^[2].

 

Indonesia, together with the Philippines, controls 72% of global nickel production. Furthermore, the inclusion of Iran adds significant zinc and copper deposits, including the Sarcheshmeh mine, which is the world’s second-largest copper deposit. Additionally, the creation of the “Partner Country” category at the 2024 Kazan Summit has brought nations like Bolivia, Kazakhstan, Vietnam and Uzbekistan into the BRICS+ orbit. Bolivia’s “Lithium Triangle” and Kazakhstan’s tungsten and REE potential further reinforce the bloc’s position as the primary supplier for the global energy transition. The coalescing of these countries has been talked about as a political necessity to strategically de-risk from the politics of the “Global North” ^[3]. This concentration of resources, in theory, gives the Global South enormous influence over future supply chains while simultaneously navigating internal asymmetries and external pressures from Western-led initiatives. Without deliberate coordination, BRICS+ risks reproducing the old commodity trap: Global South supplies get exported and advanced products (batteries, magnets, electronics) are made elsewhere, which these countries import back at a premium cost.

 

However, the aggregate strength of these reserves masks certain deep imbalances. Since the C in BRICS stands for control and consolidation, China’s processing monopoly means that even minerals primarily mined in Brazil or Africa often get refined or magnetised in China. Indeed, Chinese firms lead global rare-earth refining, over 80% of capacity, and dominate processing for battery metals^[4]. This essentially means that China effectively controls the flow of materials, which determines the various facets of energy transition across the world. In this light, BRICS+ has currently remained just a coalition of resource holders and consumers, rather than an integrated bloc.

 

The proposed ‘BRICS Geological Platform’, in 2022, was touted as a foundation for supply chain coordination, to help reduce information asymmetry and enable South-South mineral corridors through joint exploration projects, technological development, shared R&D, etc^[5]. However, there is little evidence of operationalisation and hints towards a classic case of implementation deficit that is fast becoming synonymous with BRICS+.

 

Why Cooperation Remains the “Hard Rock”

Despite the logic and necessity of alignment, BRICS+ cooperation has often remained more rhetorical than real. Three primary friction points persist:

 

• Internal Asymmetry: China’s massive head start in refining creates a natural hesitancy among other members like Brazil and India, who fear trading Western dependence for a different kind of regional hegemony.
• Competing National Interests: Many member states are in direct competition for foreign direct investment (FDI), leading to a race to the bottom in export prices rather than a race to the top in collective bargaining.
• Geopolitical Distrust: Border tensions and varying alignments within other international fora,      like the G20, make it difficult to share sensitive geological data or commit to long-term technology transfers.

 

India’s Edge: The Trusted Broker

As India assumes the BRICS presidency in 2026, it has a unique window to move the bloc beyond “paper cooperation”. Unlike other major powers, India’s theme- Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability (BRICS)-emphasises practical, modular cooperation. India can position itself as the bridge^[6]. By linking its own National Critical Minerals Mission (NCMM) with the broader BRICS+ agenda, New Delhi can offer a model of value-driven cooperation^[7]. By leveraging its “People-First” approach, India can champion three strategic levers to turn raw deposits into sovereign strength^[8]:

 

• Supply-chain resilience through inter-South diversification. Western powers have launched initiatives (e.g. the Minerals Security Partnership) to “de-risk” supply chains by diversifying away from China. BRICS+ can offer an alternative model: building resilience by linking producers, processors and consumers within the Global South. Imagine Brazilian lithium shipped to Indian or South African refineries, or Russian nickel feeding Gulf-financed smelters in the UAE. Coordinated development of these supply chains would reduce dependence on any single country. BRICS+ could also adopt an MSP-like approach by channelling coordinated public and private investment into joint projects. The New Development Bank (BRICS’ multilateral bank) and large Gulf sovereign funds have ample capital and technology, which can be linked to resource endowments and build entire resilient value chains.

 

• The Technology-Processing Nexus: Currently, many BRICS+ nations (like Brazil or South Africa) are caught in a colonial-era economic loop: they export raw ore (low value) and import refined battery components or magnets (high value). Refining technology is often treated as a “black box” protected by patents held by a few global players. India can lead an initiative for technology-sharing protocols. Additionally, it will be crucial to add to the region’s refining capacities to circumvent external dependence. For example, Argentina and Brazil could co-invest in a regional Lithium hydroxide hub in South America, while India and South Africa co-invest in a Manganese and Platinum refining centre in the Indian Ocean rim. This pools capital into a few world-class facilities rather than dozens of inefficient, small-scale plants. Since it is an energy-intensive process, refineries can be located in energy-surplus zones, which the bloc is already rich in. To end technical brain drain, India can position its global IIT, ISM campuses as centres for mineral excellence, training the Global South’s metallurgists and geologists in next-gen refining.

 

• Mineral-to-Market Framework: To move beyond simple buyer-seller relationships, BRICS+ can adopt co-ownership models similar to the Indo-Zambia Bank. The objective would be to ensure that resource-rich countries are not merely suppliers of raw materials, but equity stakeholders in downstream processing and value addition. For instance, an Indian firm could partner with an Argentine state-owned enterprise to co-develop a lithium refinery, where Argentina contributes the mineral resources and land, while India brings assured demand and technical expertise in industrial chemistry, potentially complemented by Russian metallurgical capabilities. Such an “equity-for-expertise” model would enable value retention within the Global South, embed supply security, and foster genuinely integrated supply chains rather than extractive dependencies.

Future Outlook: BRICS+ as the Pivot of the Mineral Supercycle

Taken together, these synergies suggest BRICS+ has the ingredients for a robust geopolitical alliance of materials: diversified, well-financed, and collectively powerful. Based on current trends, the BRICS+ mineral order is expected to see a significant decentralisation of processing capacity towards secondary hubs in Brazil, India, and Saudi Arabia. Whether the bloc can translate its collective potential into coordinated action remains the central question of the 21st-century commodity supercycle. The minerals of the earth are now the currencies of power, and for the first time in centuries, the mandate for their governance is moving decisively toward the Global South.

^[1] https://www.csis.org/analysis/six-new-brics-implications-energy-trade#:~:text=A3:%20Yes.,Iran%20is%20a%20good%20example.

 

^[2] https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/opinion/indo-saudi-ties-can-evolve-to-another-level-with-collaboration-on-critical-minerals-13550279.html

^[3] https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2025.2519981#d1e124

^[4] https://www.ndtv.com/opinion/when-the-dragon-tightens-its-talons-chinas-new-techno-mineral-maneuver-9460545

^[5] https://en.sputniknews.africa/20240716/brics-countries-support-creation-of-common-geological-platform-proposed-by-russias-rosnedra-1067521151.html

^[6] https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/40585/Launch_of_BRICS_India_2026_Logo_Theme_and_Website_by_the_External_Affairs_Minister

^[7] https://www.crfindia.org/publications/research-article/the-critical-mineral-map-of-power-indias-diversification-strategy

^[8] https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/40585/Launch_of_BRICS_India_2026_Logo_Theme_and_Website_by_the_External_Affairs_Minister