The post-Cold War liberal international order is experiencing significant disarray, prompting systemic change. The rules and institutions that have governed global affairs since 1945, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and the Bretton Woods financial architecture, are increasingly seen as inadequate, inequitable, and unrepresentative of the emerging influence of the Global South. In this context of systemic change, bilateral and multilateral partnerships among developing nations are evolving from mere rhetorical expressions of solidarity into essential tools for renegotiating the existing world order, underscoring their strategic importance for future global stability.
The dynamics between India and Africa exemplify the shift from rhetorical solidarity to strategic alliance, highlighting its importance for global order. What once began as a partnership grounded in anti-colonialism and non-alignment has matured over the past decade into a sophisticated, multi-faceted strategic alliance. Shared needs drive this transformation. India seeks critical mineral supply chains, energy transition partnerships, and export markets, while Africa aims for technology transfer, capacity building, and development financing without conditionalities. Both regions benefit from a demographic dividend, collectively accounting for approximately 2.9 billion people, and they share a common desire to shape a more balanced and equitable multilateral order.
From Solidarity to Strategy
India’s relationship with Africa is rooted in a long history. The substantial Indian diaspora in East and Southern Africa, the shared experience of colonial rule, and the roles both regions played in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) provided a solid foundation for cooperation after independence. The first India-Africa Forum Summit, held in 2008, formalised this collaboration through an established framework1.
However, for many years, this partnership struggled to achieve its full potential. Although India’s financial support was significant, it often arrived slowly. The “donor-recipient” model that guided this relationship did not align with the desires of many African nations, which sought equal partnerships rather than paternalistic assistance. The rise of China in Africa, characterised by infrastructure investments and favourable loans, highlighted the shortcomings of India’s approach.
Recently, India has adopted a “consultative and demand-driven” model for cooperation. Rather than imposing specific projects, India now aligns its support with Africa’s own development plans, particularly the African Union’s Agenda 2063 and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)2. This shift, along with India’s growing economic strength and technological capabilities, has positioned the partnership for greater success in the future.
Economic Dimension
The economic dimension of the India-Africa relationship has reached a significant milestone, reinforcing its strategic ambitions. Bilateral trade between India and Africa reached $93.69 billion in 2025-26, up 14.39 per cent from the previous year. India’s exports to Africa stood at $45.42 billion, while imports reached $48.27 billion during the same period3. Indian investments have shifted focus beyond traditional sectors like textiles and pharmaceuticals. Indian firms are now utilising the AfCFTA framework to establish regional manufacturing hubs across the continent, thereby reducing logistics costs and generating local employment.
The trade relationship has structural imbalances that need to be openly acknowledged. India’s imports from Africa, primarily raw materials, exceed its exports, creating a pattern reminiscent of the extractive relationships India experienced during colonial rule. Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal highlighted this tension at a recent industry dialogue, stating that while growth figures are impressive, “we should focus more on value-added manufacturing and not just raw materials”. To deepen strategic cooperation, emphasis should be placed on sectors such as agriculture, food processing, renewable energy, electric mobility, and advanced manufacturing, which can foster sustainable development and mutual benefit.
The AfCFTA holds transformative potential in this respect. As the world’s largest free trade area by number of participating countries, it promises standardised trade policies, expanded industrialisation, and strengthened regional value chains. For Indian firms, this presents an opportunity to engage not just as bilateral trade partners with individual African states but as investors within a continental economic ecosystem boasting a combined GDP of over $3 trillion. The strategic rationale is compelling: Indian capital and technology, combined with African raw materials and demographic dynamism, can drive economic outcomes neither region could achieve on its own.
India’s most distinctive contribution to international partnerships is its Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI). This system comprises a suite of interoperable, open-source platforms for digital identity, payments, and data exchange that have significantly transformed India’s governance. By increasing formal banking inclusion from 25% in 2008 to over 80% in 2023, India’s “India Stack”, which consists of Aadhaar, UPI, and related platforms, has gained global attention as a replicable model4.
In February 2026, India signed DPI cooperation agreements with 23 countries, including six African nations: Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Kenya, Ethiopia, The Gambia, and Lesotho. These agreements grant access to 18 Indian digital platforms through the India Stack Global framework, covering digital identity systems, payment infrastructure, data exchange frameworks, and public service delivery5. In addition, India’s Unified Payments Interface (UPI) has been implemented in Kenya and Mauritius, facilitating cross-border remittances at significantly lower costs. Notably, nine of the 11 countries globally implementing the Modular Open-Source Identity Platform (MOSIP) are in Africa6.
Indian tech companies and African universities have collaborated on the Africa Artificial Intelligence (AI) Skilling Initiative, launched in March 2026, to train 1 million youth in AI and data science by 20287. The e-VidyaBharti and e-AarogyaBharti initiatives in tele-education and telemedicine continue to bridge geographic disparities across the continent.
What is particularly significant about this aspect of the partnership is its contrast to the zero-sum framing often seen in great-power competition. China’s infrastructure investments in Africa have frequently faced criticism, sometimes warranted, sometimes exaggerated, for fostering debt dependency and asymmetric power dynamics. In contrast, India’s DPI exports are open-source, relatively low-cost, and designed to enhance state capacity rather than undermine it. This represents a model of technology diplomacy based on the principle of shared digital sovereignty, which aligns well with African aspirations for technological self-determination.
The Green Geopolitics Frontier
The most strategically significant and geopolitically contested aspect of the India-Africa partnership in 2026 is the critical minerals domain. The global energy transition requires large quantities of cobalt, lithium, copper, rare earths, and manganese volumes that greatly exceed current production levels. Africa is home to an estimated 30% of the world’s critical mineral reserves. As India accelerates its domestic electric vehicle (EV) manufacturing and renewable energy transition, it needs secure, long-term supply chains for these essential materials.
India is currently establishing offtake agreements for cobalt, lithium, and copper from the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia. Through the India-Zambia Technology Transfer Programme and existing Joint Permanent Commission frameworks, technical cooperation has started in areas such as geological mapping, early-stage exploration, and the co-development of digital mineral data repositories8. In Zimbabwe, India’s lithium diplomacy emphasises sustainability standards as a strategic differentiator from Chinese competitors, highlighting that India values the reputational and governance aspects of resource extraction, which are essential for the legitimacy of this partnership.
Additionally, a trilateral dimension is emerging. Discussions around a potential India-Africa-Japan framework, initiated at the Ninth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD9) Summit in Yokohama in August 2025, could offer competitive alternatives to existing supply chains, especially in high-purity mineral processing and battery materials9. This multilateral approach shows the sophistication with which Indian strategic planners are addressing the critical minerals challenge not merely as a bilateral transactional issue, but as a cornerstone of a broader, rules-based, equitable resource governance framework.
Global Governance and the Multipolar Initiative
The partnership between India and Africa is playing a significant role in reshaping global governance. A landmark achievement came during India’s 2023 presidency of the G20, when it successfully advocated for the African Union to gain permanent membership. This move gave Africa a lasting voice in global financial governance discussions for the first time. It also highlighted India’s ability to translate its diplomatic influence into concrete structural outcomes for its partners.
At the 17th BRICS Summit in Rio de Janeiro in July 2025, Prime Minister Modi proposed redefining BRICS as “Building Resilience and Innovation for Cooperation and Sustainability”. This approach emphasises a people-centric, humanity-first ideology and calls for urgent reforms of the UN Security Council and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to reflect the realities of the 21st century better. With African members such as Egypt, Ethiopia, and South Africa included in BRICS+, and the African Union now part of the G20, the foundation for a truly inclusive multilateral order is beginning to take shape.
Both India and Africa share a vision that seeks not to replace Western-led multilateralism with an authoritarian alternative, such as the CRINK model involving China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Instead, they aim to reform and democratise existing institutions. This distinction is crucial for analysis. India’s foreign policy is explicitly non-aligned; it engages with the Quad for maritime security, hosts the G20, holds the BRICS presidency, and advocates for the Global South all at once. Similarly, African states resist bloc logic and prefer to maintain strategic autonomy across various competing power centres.
Challenges
Institutional coordination remains one of the biggest challenges. To achieve bilateral trade aspirations, there is a need for clearer implementation frameworks, stronger dispute resolution mechanisms, and more coherent investment protection agreements. The IAFS process should focus on producing ecosystem outcomes rather than merely delivering projects.
Additionally, India faces increasing competition in Africa. China’s presence, through infrastructure development, trade, and diplomatic outreach under the FOCAC initiative, remains formidable. The EU’s Global Gateway Initiative, the United States’ critical minerals diplomacy, and Turkey’s rising influence as a middle power on the continent indicate that India is operating in a crowded engagement landscape. Strategic clarity and consistent implementation, rather than mere rhetoric, will determine the outcome of India’s efforts.
Moreover, governance and stability challenges in parts of Africa pose risks for long-term investment commitments. With successive military coups occurring in West and Central Africa since 2020, along with ongoing conflict zones and weak institutional frameworks, India must navigate these complexities without imposing governance conditions, while still protecting its own commercial and strategic interests.
Lastly, the imbalance in the trade structure, where India primarily exports finished goods while importing raw materials, needs to be consciously addressed. This can be achieved through genuine technology transfer, local manufacturing partnerships, and skills development. Otherwise, the partnership may end up reproducing the very hierarchies it seeks to overcome.
Conclusion
The India-Africa convergence in 2026 represents more than just a diplomatic success story. Together, India and Africa form a central force in the emerging global order: a democratic, diverse, and demographically growing bloc that is increasingly interconnected and redefining international cooperation. The sustainability of this partnership will depend on the depth of its institutional development, the authenticity of its technology transfers, and its willingness to move beyond mere raw-material exchanges to create genuine value together.
References:
1 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Speeches, 8 April 2008, accessed on May 17, 2026 https://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/1520_8th-april-2008-speeches.pdf
2 Embassy of India, Berlin, “Press Release”, Embassy of India, Berlin, accessed on May 17, 2026, https://indianembassyberlin.gov.in/PressRelease?id=OTk,
3 Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “Press Release”, Press Information Bureau, accessed May 17, 2026, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2261202®=3&lang=2
4 ACCESS Development Services, Inclusive Finance India Report 2025 (New Delhi: ACCESS Development Services, 2025), https://globalinclusivefinance.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Inclusive-Finance-India-Report-2025.pdf
5 Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “Press Release”, Press Information Bureau, accessed on May 17, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2224505®=3&lang=1
6 Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “Press Release”, Press Information Bureau, accessed on May 17, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2224505®=3&lang=2
7 “ India’s JNS Cloud Solutions Launches Landmark AI Skilling Initiative for Africa”, Outlook Business, March 27, 2026, accessed May 17, 2026 https://www.outlookbusiness.com/corporate/indias-jns-cloud-solutions-launches-landmark-ai-skilling-initiative-for-africa
8 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Joint Communique: 6th Session of Zambia-India Joint Permanent Commission,” Ministry of External Affairs, November 6, 2024, accessed May 17, 2026, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/38493/Joint_Communique_6th_Session_of_Zambia_India_Joint_Permanent_Commission
9 Mohanasakthivel J and Arnab Dasgupta, “TICAD 9 and the Indian Ocean: Prospects for India–Japan Collaboration,” Issue Brief, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, October 1, 2025, https://idsa.in/publisher/issuebrief/ticad-9-and-the-indian-ocean-prospects-for-india-japan-collaboration
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