“Canada has demonstrated a strong impulse to build relationships with the Global South”

Diplomatist spoke with Andrew F. Cooper to understand Canada’s evolving approach to BRICS in a rapidly shifting global order. In this wide-ranging conversation, Cooper unpacks Canada’s “variable geometry” strategy, highlighting a flexible, interest-driven engagement with BRICS nations rather than a bloc-based approach. He discusses the implications of BRICS expansion, the challenges posed by geopolitical tensions, and Canada’s selective cooperation with key members such as India, Brazil, and South Africa. The interview also explores emerging opportunities in trade diversification, energy partnerships, higher education collaboration, and global governance, while assessing BRICS’ growing role within an increasingly multipolar world.

Andrew F. Cooper, University Research Chair, Department of Political Science, and Professor at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, University of Waterloo. He is the author of: The Concertation Impulse in World Politics: Contestation over Fundamental Institutions and the Constrictions of Institutionalist International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024): 372. The BRICS – A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016): 144.

 

1. How do you assess Canada’s evolving engagement with BRICS countries, particularly in the context of their growing influence on global economic governance, multilateral cooperation, and strategic dialogue?

Considerations around Canada’s evolving engagement with the BRICS countries need to be viewed through the “variable geometry” approach presented by Prime Minister Mark Carney in his January 2026 address at the World Economic Forum in Davos. Such an approach, however, privileges the positioning of BRICS not as a solid bloc, but as a distinctively heterogeneous association of member states with different worldviews and varying levels of capacity. A heightened association with BRICS, oriented toward bilateral collaboration, has considerable appeal in terms of the opportunity to diversify away from traditional ideological or values-based alignments toward a more diversified and instrumental approach.

However, given the complications generated by geopolitical factors, the emphasis remains on the “variable” dimension. Although the Carney government has made considerable efforts to rebuild relations with China and India, serious tensions remain regarding Russia and Iran. Since 2014 when Canada took the lead in suspending Russia from the G7/8 following the annexation of Crimea, Canadian sanctions on Russia have increased, targeting actors complicit in the violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and in human rights violations. Recent examples of intensified actions include measures against Russia’s shadow fleet and restrictions aimed at curbing its oil revenues. A similar pattern exists with Iran, with an expansion of sanctions over the past two years, including the listing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organisation under the Canadian Criminal Code.

With these geopolitical constraints in place, strategic dialogue and cooperative initiatives with BRICS require selectivity. The notion of Canada pushing for observer status in BRICS has been mooted by some commentators; however, this approach appears highly unlikely under current conditions. Indeed, consistent with the “variable geometry” approach, the most significant engagement with BRICS has occurred on an individual basis, such as inviting leaders from select BRICS countries, India, Brazil, and South Africa, to attend the 2025 G7 in Kananaskis, Alberta, when Canada held the presidency.

Common membership in the G20 also allows Canada to engage BRICS countries on a flexible basis, notably with host South Africa at the November 2025 Johannesburg Summit, underscored by the meeting between Prime Minister Carney and President Cyril Ramaphosa, aimed at boosting bilateral trade and strengthening cooperation in clean energy and critical minerals.

 

2. With the recent expansion of BRICS to include countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Egypt, how does Canada view the emergence of a more diversified and enlarged grouping in the broader international system?

The most important feature of BRICS+ expansion for Canada is the confirmation that the world is becoming more multipolar, with a greater profile for several ambitious and well-positioned countries that are not members of traditional establishments such as NATO and the G7. The relationship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is indicative of how the “variable geometry” approach operates. Similar to China and India, a resetting of relations has taken place.

Facilitated by a May 2025 phone call between Prime Minister Carney and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, this process has focused on economic diversification, energy security, and over $4 billion in bilateral trade. However, there have not yet been leadership-level visits, with the Crown Prince declining the invitation to attend the 2025 Kananaskis G7. That said, ministerial-level meetings have resumed, aimed at enhancing cooperation in artificial intelligence, critical minerals, and clean energy as part of a renewed diplomatic effort.

Here, the evolving relationship between Canada and the United Arab Emirates serves as a useful model. A high-level visit by Prime Minister Carney in November 2025 and the announcement of formal negotiations for a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), set to begin in 2026, alongside the promise of UAE investment in Canadian “nation-building” projects—including liquefied natural gas (LNG) and critical minerals—highlight this trajectory.

Canada has also upgraded its relationship with Indonesia (a BRICS member since January 2025) with the signing of a CEPA in 2025, the first of its kind between Canada and an ASEAN nation at the core of Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy.

 

3. To what extent do you believe BRICS can serve as an effective platform for articulating the aspirations of the Global South, and how does Canada position itself in relation to these evolving dynamics?

Although the portrayal of BRICS as a solid bloc with uniform interests can be contested, the claim to a solidarist ethos within the grouping remains strong. Symbolically, BRICS represents an updated version of the collective identity of the Global South, tracing back to the 1955 Asian–African Bandung Conference—a stand-alone summit process that excluded Western allied countries.

However, even this legacy should not be overstated. As in the earlier period, there remains strong competition between China and India for leadership of the Global South. Additionally, unlike at Bandung, the presence of Russia introduces a more complex dynamic.

Canada has demonstrated a strong impulse to build relationships with the Global South as part of a diversification strategy away from the United States, particularly in response to the coercive approach adopted by President Trump regarding tariffs and rhetoric about making Canada the 51st state.

Consistent with its bilateral approach to South Africa, Canada launched a “Global Africa Strategy” in 2025, focusing on critical minerals, clean energy, and infrastructure, alongside the establishment of a new office in Cape Town. Nevertheless, criticisms persist that, despite these initiatives, Canada has reduced foreign aid, resulting in both reputational and material consequences.

 

4. How do you view the trajectory of India–Canada relations within the wider context of engagement with BRICS countries, particularly in areas such as trade, diplomacy, development cooperation, and global governance?

India–Canada relations have improved considerably under Prime Minister Carney’s government. An early signal of this shift was the invitation extended to Prime Minister Narendra Modi to attend the 2025 Kananaskis G7.

Similarly, a meeting attended by officials from the core members of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network took place on the sidelines of the Raisina Dialogue in March 2025, hosted by India’s Ministry of External Affairs and the Observer Research Foundation.

 

5. As India assumes the BRICS Presidency, what priorities or initiatives would Canada welcome that could contribute to constructive dialogue, inclusive cooperation, and stronger engagement between BRICS and key international partners?

In line with its “variable geometry” approach, Canada would welcome a framing of BRICS as a “non-West” rather than an “anti-West” grouping, with India playing a key role in steering this direction. Canada, with its longstanding commitment to Bretton Woods institutions, remains cautious about initiatives such as de-dollarisation and alternative payment systems like BRICS Pay.

At the same time, there are divided opinions in Canada regarding the role of the New Development Bank. Engagement may be viewed positively if it enhances Canadian businesses’ access to fast-growing BRICS markets and supports diversification away from reliance on the United States. This perspective may gain traction with BRICS expansion, particularly with the inclusion of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Indonesia. However, constraints remain due to geopolitical concerns and questions about whether the NDB is undercapitalised.

 

6. Given the presence of several major energy producers within BRICS, how does Canada assess the grouping’s potential role in influencing global energy governance, supply resilience, and the transition toward sustainable energy systems?

A key example of Canada’s energy engagement with BRICS countries is its relationship with India. During Prime Minister Carney’s visit to India in March 2026, Canada and India finalised a C$2.6 billion agreement for Saskatchewan-based Cameco to supply nearly 22 million pounds of uranium to India from 2027 to 2035. This agreement, part of a broader Strategic Energy Partnership, includes enhanced cooperation on LNG, critical minerals, and renewable energy sources such as wind and solar to support India’s growing energy demands.

 

7. How important do you consider cooperation in higher education, research, science, and innovation between Canada and BRICS nations in strengthening long-term partnerships and fostering knowledge-based collaboration?

Cooperation in higher education, research, science, and innovation is highly significant within Canada’s “variable geometry” approach, as it enables engagement across multiple, overlapping spheres of influence, fostering resilient, knowledge-based collaboration and strengthening Canada’s role as a middle power in a fragmented geopolitical landscape.

In relation to India, Canada is advancing sector-specific partnerships in artificial intelligence, clean technology (including hydrogen), health research, and education. In February 2026, Canada launched a Talent and Innovation Strategy with India, involving 13 new university partnerships to facilitate exchanges, research, and joint academic programmes in arts, business, and STEM fields. This includes joint degrees, “2+2” programmes, and industry-linked PhDs, designed to build long-term knowledge ecosystems. The establishment of initiatives such as the University of British Columbia South Asia Hub further embeds Canadian research capacity in India, signalling a move toward sustained, networked collaboration.

In relation to China, cooperation remains constrained by concerns over links between academic institutions and military entities. While Prime Minister Carney’s January 2026 visit outlined areas of collaboration, most current engagement is limited to researcher mobility, co-authorship networks, and longstanding faculty and institutional partnerships.

In relation to South Africa, a 2025 Memorandum of Understanding between South Africa’s National Research Foundation and Canada’s SSHRC formalised long-term collaboration in research, training, and innovation. This builds on the South Africa–Canada Universities Network (SACUN), based at Carleton University, which connects academic and policy institutions in both countries.

In relation to Indonesia, engagement remains largely regional through ASEAN under Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. Programmes such as Scholarships and Educational Exchanges for Development (SEED) exemplify a modular, multilateral approach to education diplomacy, which could potentially evolve into deeper bilateral engagement.

With Brazil, the Emerging Leaders in the Americas Program (ELAP) remains a flagship initiative, while the renewed Science, Technology, and Innovation Agreement supports collaborative research in sectors such as clean energy, life sciences, and ocean technology.

 

8. From Canada’s strategic perspective, what should be the key areas of engagement with BRICS countries in the years ahead, and how do you see the grouping’s role evolving within an increasingly multipolar and complex global order?

As noted, Canada’s “variable geometry” approach shapes its engagement with BRICS. As a member of NATO and the G7, there is limited space, or appetite, for institutional engagement that involves countries such as Russia and Iran. However, there are significant opportunities for deeper ties with other BRICS and BRICS+ members, particularly in terms of economic engagement.

Prime Minister Carney’s January 2026 address in Davos signalled a broader strategy of diversification away from the United States. Strengthening ties with countries such as India, China, Brazil, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Indonesia offers considerable potential.

However, these countries differ from the traditional middle powers with which Canada has historically engaged. As a result, Canada’s approach will likely emphasise functional cooperation and pragmatic dialogue, marked by flexibility, nuance, and an instrumental focus on mutual benefit.