Indonesia occupies an important and significant position in the Global South, and its important geo-strategic position in the Indo-Pacific region will impact the geopolitics of the region and the Global South.
To start with, Indonesia occupies a key geo-strategic position in the Indo-Pacific region, connecting Asia to the wider Pacific region in the Southern Hemisphere. It straddles the confluence of two important regions—the Indian and the South-West Pacific. Important sea lanes run through or near its territory, including, in particular, the Strait of Malacca.
In this context, Indonesia’s position and aspirations are encouraging a maritime approach to security, one that differs from its previous inward-looking security focus. It has released a new maritime doctrine and begun steps to modernize and increase the Indonesian Navy. A ‘green-water’ blueprint envisages a 274-ship navy by 2024. This is Indonesia’s largest naval modernization plan in more than 40 years, and it will substantially increase the country’s profile in the Indo-Pacific region.
With the emergence of the Indo-Pacific region as a key geo-strategic entity, Indonesia, at the confluence of both Indian and Pacific segments, is becoming more important not only in the region but also in the wider Global South politics. Its profile in the international arena is growing. It has expanded the range and scope of its diplomatic initiatives while transitioning from a primarily continental, inward-looking strategic orientation to an expanding maritime outlook, extending its strategic reach in the wider Indo-Pacific region.
Along with its enhanced presence in the Indo-Pacific region, it has sought to formulate a grand strategy. Furthermore, Indonesia has become important in the United States’ forward policy or pivot in the Indo-Pacific region. The archipelago is a ‘gateway zone’ for the Eurasian rimland and the offshore continent of Australia, which is an important player in the Global South.
The growing importance of Indonesia’s geo-political position has given a fillip to its maritime strategy. As a country made up of 18,000 islands, Indonesia’s maritime culture is crucial. It must realize that its future is largely determined by how it manages the oceans, which can help it claim its rightful position in the Global South.
Meanwhile, Indonesia is the largest archipelagic state in the world. It has within its waters some of the most strategic sea lanes globally, connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Furthermore, of the three areas identified as key to power projection in the Indo-Pacific region—the Indian subcontinent, the South China Sea, and the South-West Pacific—Indonesia, as a resident power, has a military presence in two of them: the South China Sea and the South-West Pacific.
On the other hand, Indonesia will be an important geo-political player in the 21st century. Jakarta has accordingly begun evolving a grand strategy of its own. It also occupies an important place in the strategic outlook of powers like India and the United States, which are seeking to contain China’s increased maritime expansion in the Indo-Pacific region.
An aggressive reform agenda enacted during former Indonesian President Yudhoyono’s first term (2004–2009) provided the impetus for economic growth, including the expansion of its maritime reach in the wider Indo-Pacific. Further, this included significant reforms in the service sector and tax and customs regimes, along with enhanced capital market development and supervision. These changes are credited with setting the stage for growth. The administration also won plaudits from multilateral agencies for its stringent fiscal management, resulting in a debt-to-GDP ratio of less than 25 percent and a fiscal deficit of less than 3 percent.
Propelled by prudent macroeconomic management from the start of the 21st century, Indonesia has strong domestic consumption and investment, as well as rising prices for its commodity exports such as palm oil, copper, and rubber, which it exports to other countries in the Global South.
Adding to this, Indonesia’s growth rates have been exceptionally strong over the past decade—generally in the 5–6.5 percent range, except during the global financial crisis. This economic growth means that, like China, India, and Australia in the Indo-Pacific region, Indonesia will invest in its strategic priorities, increase its defense budget, and expand its reach both militarily and diplomatically.
At present, the Indonesian armed forces’ basic doctrine places primary emphasis on the army, the dominant service in the Indonesian military. Both the air force and the navy are charged with providing direct support to the army, with their individual service missions secondary in importance.
Meanwhile, the army prides itself on its historic role as a revolutionary people’s army and as the prime mover in the achievement of Indonesia’s independence. As with other praetorian revolutionary armies transitioning to civilian leadership, the military, especially the land force, still plays a major role in deciding Indonesia’s national security strategy.
From Jakarta’s independence, its military—mainly its standing army—has viewed itself as the guardian of national unity and cohesiveness. It is co-equal with the civilian political leadership (some Indonesian military advocates note that the establishment of the army predated that of the republic).
On the other hand, unlike armies in other Southeast Asian states such as Thailand and the Philippines, the Indonesian Army developed an ideological and legal framework to support a formal role in both governance and the expansion of Indonesia’s legitimate authority within its territory.
Jakarta’s strategic approach in the 21st century involves modernizing the armed forces over the next ten to fifteen years, including through investment in anti-ship missiles, new warships, submarines, and combat aircraft.
In an effort to enhance its strategic capability and outreach, Indonesia’s 2010 Strategic Defence Plan formulated the goal of developing a minimum essential force by 2024. Key elements of this force include the development of a ‘green-water’ navy, major upgrades to air combat capability, the development of a more mobile and agile land force, and the creation of a viable domestic military industrial base.
As a result of the strategic maritime expansion, the minimum essential force will comprise a 274-ship navy, ten fighter squadrons, and twelve new diesel-electric submarines. While Indonesia has had similar ambitions in the past, this time the match between resources and ambitions seems closer.
This translates into a situation in which Indonesia graduates as a major maritime power, capable of expanding the range and scope of its operations and becoming an asset in various contingencies, including assisting in Australia’s security.
In conclusion, Indonesia will approach its strategic outreach as part of its effort to develop relations in the Global South. This strategy could bring Indonesia full circle, as it reclaims its position as an active partner in the Non-Aligned Movement and asserts its rightful place in the Global South.
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