The vicissitudes of South Asian geopolitics have an inadvertent tendency to vindicate the popular dictum of history immanently repeating itself first as tragedy, and then, as farce. The insecurities enveloping South Asian states adduce to the eternal return of geopolitical turbulence. This turbulence has entrenched due to perpetual security threats associated with regional geopolitics, ranging from, inter alia the festering wounds of partition to the fallouts of violent extremism, the security dilemma of smaller states, and the oft-detrimental policies of extra-regional powers. Furthermore, geopolitical turbulence is the empirical reality deployed to justify contemporaneous assertions of the ‘end of South Asia’, variously attributed to the myriad of the region’s protean and intractable nodes of insecurity. Such self-justificatory assertions, however, downplay the transformative role of regional balancers and their foreign policy choices, while at once negating possible exceptions to the rule.
The only noteworthy exception to the rule of South Asian turbulence—albeit no less troubled by its geopolitics—is India. Despite entrenched challenges to its Neighbourhood First Policy—coupled with Chinese encirclement and campaigns of denigration—India has been able to manage the risks associated with South Asia’s geopolitical turbulence, thereby enhancing regional security without jeopardizing its core values, economic growth, and global credentials as a first responder and preferred security partner. The reversal of the ‘India Out’ campaign and the amicable disengagement with China over Ladakh are some recent examples which may accelerate the prospects of smaller South Asian states acknowledging India’s regional preponderance and role as a security maximizer. In due course, its transformative role in South Asia has come to suggest an inflection point, whereby India is purportedly ‘winning its geostrategic competition with China in the region’ (Grossman, 2023). The present endeavour, however, proffers an alternative argument rooted in the evolutionary dynamics of South Asian geopolitics and India’s advertised strategic autonomy in external affairs.
Since regional domination by violence has never been an appealing strategy for a self-contained and self-satisfied India, its diplomacy vis-à-vis South Asia is calibrated towards forms of regional transformation which aid in its advent as an autonomous and globally-recognised power pole. Also, the imperative of transforming not only its domestic security scenario, but that of the entire South Asian and Indian Ocean regions—as India’s immediate, and most significant, orbits of power and influence. Towards these ends, India has deployed some political-context-specific security strategies, which are identifiable under three broad endeavours: turbulence management; escalation control; and, the sub–continentalisation of South Asia.
Turbulence Management
India’s pragmatism has enabled it to better manage South Asian turbulence—often turning adversity into opportunity. Turbulence management involves the identification, assessment, and redressal of potential threats to national security which, if neglected, may snowball into challenges and/or conflicts. It, however, transcends risk and conflict management, being essentially an enterprise of juggling several tranches of turbulence either for defusing these or to reap the maximum geopolitical tractions therefrom. Successful turbulence management, therefore, requires solid diplomatic and strategic capabilities. China is the most compelling source of turbulence in South Asia. Although the West has pitted the Chinese presence in South Asia and the IOR as the most disabling geostrategic challenge for India, it has on the obverse, aided in India’s rapid rise as a stable and autonomous countervailing power in the region. India has managed turbulence through the targeted ‘congagement’ of China (Elliott 2018) but has also effectively pursued de-hyphenated bilateral engagements with its neighbours while forging new alliances to contain Chinese influence in South Asia.
A recent example in this regard is the case of Bangladesh. India’s declaration of commitment to bilateral stability and maintenance of diplomatic ties with future regimes—while at once providing safe haven to the deposed Sheikh Hasina—successfully defused bilateral tensions in the immediate aftermath of the Bangladeshi political crisis, while also allaying trepidations of yet another protracted refugee crisis in the subcontinent. Ergo, turbulence management increased India’s regional stock while allegations of Western, Chinese, and Pakistani hidden hands in Hasina’s plight surfaced in the media. Furthermore, India’s role in post-Taliban 2.0 Afghanistan is a case where it could prevail as a counterpoint to Pakistan and China—with the latter’s stillborn infrastructure and mining projects in Afghanistan due to Pakistani opposition and the alleged involvement of Afghans in terrorist attacks on Chinese nationals along the China-Pakistan-Economic-Corridor (CPEC). India’s development aid, humanitarian assistance, and resumption of consular services have been welcomed and reciprocated by the Taliban government through its plea to New Delhi to complete a number of stalled infrastructure projects. Cognisant of Bangladesh and Afghanistan as potential bases for anti-India activities, New Delhi has nonetheless taken the gamble for enhancing South Asian security through turbulence management. Moreover, the origins of yet another significant tactical manoeuvre could be observed through the recent visit of India’s External Affairs Minister to Pakistan for the SCO Summit, alongside Islamabad’s persistence to engage with New Delhi to overcome its geopolitical isolation in South Asia.
Escalation Control
India’s recent diplomatic breakthrough with Pakistan is in tune with its strategy of controlling South Asian escalation spirals. Indian endeavours of escalation control assume rational actors—especially if those possess nuclear weapons—for negotiating the containment of escalatory conflicts, while not necessarily overemphasising the root causes thereof. India exhibited remarkable strategic adaptability towards escalation control when tensions arose in its relations with Maldives earlier this year. By promptly engaging with President Muizzu’s China-leaning regime on its demand for the withdrawal of Indian troops, New Delhi prevented a challenge along its western flank from morphing into a larger conflict that would have provided the Chinese with the pretext for regular PLA-N forays into the Arabian Sea. Not only did this approach underscore the importance of diplomacy in escalation control—tactically, the preservation of India’s strategic assets in Maldives—but it also reinforced India’s image as a regional stabiliser and security partner.
Significantly, the Sino-India consensus reached on the side-lines of the 16th BRICS Summit, followed by the quick and complete disengagement along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh—after a four-year standoff—demonstrates the efficacy of India’s escalation control in pursuit of regional stability. Conversely, India’s emergence as a key geopolitical actor in South Asia, as the recent accomplishments of its policies and multilateral security initiatives—e.g. the Act East; the upcoming shared security infrastructure under the BIMSTEC; the IORA; and the Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR)—have seemingly precipitated a revision in China’s erstwhile competitive approach of engagements.
Sub-continentalisation
Although such multilateral forays provide an impression of India’s contributions toward the expansion/externalisation of South Asian security complexes, it has in the obverse, established a pattern of the sub-continentalisation of the region. South Asia is the only geopolitical region that stands apart from other macro-realms in the geographical layout of the globe. The long-term prospect for South Asia is to evolve into a realm led by India, encompassing the African and Southeast Asian coastlands of the Indian Ocean basin (Cohen, 2015: 42, 47). Consistent with this template, recent developments emanating from India’s leadership style, defence policy achievements, and enhancement of hard power have seemingly fostered a consensus amongst South Asian states of its pivotal role in regional security complexes. It has also, concurrently, sharpened the prospects of regional transformation through the emergence of a sub-continental ecosystem of diplomacy, cooperation, and stability led by and centred upon India.
In fine, contrary to pessimistic assertions of the end of South Asia, several emergent arches of security and cooperation can be adduced, which took together, heralds the region’s re-imagination and transformation. India’s strategic autonomy in practice—its endeavours towards bolstering South Asian security—has thus far neutralised several nodes of regional insecurity, while at once ensuring minimal extra-regional interference in its immediate orbits of power and influence. The implications of India’s strategic engagements with South Asia, not least the prospects of sub-continentalisation, are likely to magnify with further strides in its economic and military indicators—as the instruments behind negotiated dispute settlement. If history holds the key to geopolitics, it is replete with instances of durable, secure, and interdependent regions centred upon developed, autonomous, and recognized great powers. A new South Asia is being forged on this historically-sanctioned blueprint.
References
Cohen, Saul Bernard (2015). Geopolitics: The Geography of International Relations, 3rd Ed. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
Elliott, John (2018). ‘As China expands its Footprints, India could look at ‘Congagement’,’ The Wire, 22 January [online: web], accessed on 31 October 2024, URL: https://thewire.in/diplomacy/china-expands-footprint-india-look-congagement.
Grossman, Derek (2023). ‘India Is Pushing Back Against China in South Asia,’ RAND, 21 August [online: web], accessed on 31 October 2024, URL: https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/08/india-is-pushing-back-against-china-in-south-asia.html.
Keywords: China; Geopolitics; India’s Engagements with South Asia States; Regional Stability; South Asian Security Complexes; Sub-continentalisation
Blurb 1: The only noteworthy exception to the rule of South Asian turbulence—albeit no less troubled by its geopolitics—is India.
Blurb 2: The long-term prospect for South Asia is to evolve into a realm led by India.
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