The Philippines, with its more than 7,600 islands, is vulnerable to a wide range of marine hazards. Seven serious maritime dangers that affect the nation are illicit fishing, terrorism, piracy, smuggling, human trafficking, marine pollution and environmental degradation, and intrusions, according to an upcoming research by The Asia Foundation and Amador Research Services. Poverty is one of the main causes of these transnational crimes, while fragmented marine governance is another. The latter occurs when duties, responsibilities, and sometimes even mandates of maritime law enforcement agencies overlap, creating difficulties for the agency during operations. The Philippines’ particular experiences as an archipelagic country influence how it administers its maritime domain. The Philippines’ conception and approach to maritime security is improved to meet the challenges of the present and the future, as internal and external maritime dangers continue to grow and rise in the region. Apart from internal limitations, the Philippines is confronted with other regional obstacles. It must first contend with conflicting maritime claims in the South China Sea and agreements with Southeast Asian states on delimitations. The intensifying tensions in the South China Sea are a second, more pressing issue that has prompted reactions from worried international organizations like the EU and the Quad.
The Philippines enacted its first national marine policy thirty years ago, which aimed to combine the various aspects of the nation’s nautical domain. The Philippines published its National Marine Policy (NMP) in November 1994, readying it for the Law of the Sea Convention to go into effect that same year. Most significantly, the realization that the ocean could benefit the Philippine economy served as the catalyst for the creation of an ocean policy. As a result, economic reasoning dominated the NMP, particularly when it came to figuring out how the Philippines may strategically incorporate its maritime and coastal resources into its economic foundation. It was anticipated that the NMP would lead to a change in development strategy that highlights the nation’s identity as an archipelagic state. It acknowledged that the nation has underutilized the sea’s potential due to its emphasis on land-based activity. It went on to suggest that a framework that is true to the Philippines’ status as an archipelagic nation must be established and adhered to. The 1994 National Marine Policy (NMP), the National Security Policy (NSP), and the National Security Strategy (NSS) are three important texts that shape the Philippines’ perception of maritime security.
These long-standing problems with internal administration and governance are now made worse by new foreign threats and conflicts, which forces the Philippines to invest more money, materials, and labour to make the improvements it wants to see happen quickly. This increases the pressure on the political elite and bureaucracy in place now to address both the ongoing maritime issues and the new dangers that are coming up at the same time. This has implications that are particularly clear in the creation and distribution of resources since it calls on the continued availability of sufficient resources to deal with the intricate and varied maritime issues.
Southeast Asia faces serious challenges related to maritime security, and the geopolitical implications of this issue are immense. This is particularly true for small countries navigating a maritime domain that is influenced by and caught up in the politics of great nations. While the U.S.-China rivalry frequently takes place on the stage of maritime security in Southeast Asia, there are other significant environmental and resource issues at hand as well as rival claims made by neighboring states in the South China Sea. There are many intricate tensions in the bilateral relationship between China and the Philippines. Relations with China seemed to be improving after tumultuous ones under President Ferdinand Marcos throughout the late 20th century. That is until a dramatic shift in discourse was brought about by the South China Sea disputes. There is no denying China’s attempts to assert authority over the disputed Spratly Islands. A significant militarization of the maritime features is part of this. The Philippines has retaliated against China’s claims by fortifying its own positions through a variety of means. Using a national narrative, The Hague trial and verdict, forming alliances, seizing advantageous positions, and engaging in diplomatic cooperation are some of these tactics.
There are three reasons why the Philippines stands out in this particular situation.
First, China’s maritime and territorial claims, as well as its actions in Filipino waters in the South China Sea, were declared unconstitutional in an arbitration dispute that the Philippines won in 2016. Not a single Southeast Asian claimant state has proceeded to file a complaint against China with the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Second, the Philippines’ relationship with China is greatly impacted by its long-standing partnership with the United States. Last but not least, given the escalating hostilities between the US and China, the Philippines is a crucial player in any potential Taiwan contingency plans. This is due to its close proximity to Taiwan—the northernmost islands of the Philippines are just 233 miles away from Taiwan—as well as its alliance with the United States. These factors influence the Philippines’ viewpoint and method of handling marine security issues.
From a geopolitical standpoint, the Philippines uses lawfare to counter Chinese challenges in the South China Sea and U.S.-China competition. This is evidenced by the 2013 case the Philippines filed against China in the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The 2016 award leaned significantly in favour of the Philippines. A second complaint that Manila plans to file in court is in response to claims that Beijing is harming coral reefs within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines.
The lawsuit that thrust the conflict into the spotlight is the most often used tactic pertaining to U.S.-Philippine claims in the South China Sea. Despite the PCR’s belief that the case would not be heard by The Hague court, it was actually accepted for hearing, which dealt a serious blow to China. The legality of each feature in the Spratly Islands was contested by the Philippines. The panel invalidated Beijing’s flimsy historic claims in this way. The Hague rendered a decision about the legal standing of each Spratly Island feature that the Philippines had brought up. According to maritime law, none of the Spratly Islands—including the largest ones—can be considered islands, as they are unable to support a stable community of humans or independent economic life. According to maritime law, none of the Spratly Islands—including the largest maritime features—can support a stable human society or a self-sufficient economy, hence none of them are considered to be islands. Therefore, only territorial seas—not continental shelf or exclusive economic zones—are affected by China’s island claims. China’s maritime entitlements were nullified when it was established that a number of features it had claimed were simply rock formations and other reefs. All in all, The Hague’s rulings render void any Chinese claim within the nine-dash line that extends beyond the contested islets and the territorial waters they give rise to. For the Philippines, which worried China was getting too close to home, this is wonderful news.
China uses the historical relations strategy too often, while the Philippines bases its justification for current policies on its national history. The Philippines has attached its national narrative and identity to the disputed territory by means of its historical ties to the island. Japan was compelled to give up its claims to a number of South China Sea islands in 1951 as a result of the Treaties of San Francisco and Peace with Taiwan. China was left out of these conversations. So, there was a gap in ownership. China seized the chance right away to reaffirm its sovereignty over the islands and its sphere of influence in the South China Sea. But in 1956, Tomas Cloma, a native of the Philippines, found what he believed to be fifty-three unclaimed features in the South China Sea. China compelled Cloma to renounce his claims and accept responsibility for his conduct, asserting that the region has been under its control since the Han era in 2 B.C. Additionally, Cloma was compelled to give the land to the Philippine authorities. After almost a dozen years, three of the islands were invaded by Philippine forces under President Ferdinand Marcos. As a result, in 1978, the Philippine province of Palawan was given authority over the islands.
Manila ignored the 2016 decision and cut ties with the United States and other Western nations during the Duterte Senior government. Duterte attempted to end the Visiting Forces Agreement, a fundamental component of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and the Philippines, at that time and avoided travelling to any Western nations. Manila adopted this stance to indicate its desire to strengthen its relations with Beijing in return for financial concessions. Despite acknowledging China’s threat in the West Philippine Sea, Duterte made an effort to broaden Manila’s coalition of security allies. However, Manila’s strategic options were restricted by upsetting relations with the country’s only conventional security source and treaty partner. Apart from the lack of financial benefits, this action further strengthened it ties. The damage from this experimentation created more challenges than benefits for the Philippines’ ability to exercise its sovereignty and sovereign rights over the West Philippine Sea, even though the former president eventually made a calculated U-turn towards the end of his term by expressing more support for a stronger US-Philippine alliance.
President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has positioned Philippine claims in the South China Sea at the forefront of his foreign policy, in contrast to his predecessor. The Philippines would not back down from its claims in the South China Sea, as the Marcos government made clear when it filed diplomatic protests using the Arbitral Award to strengthen its stance and draw attention from around the world. The Philippine Coast Guard has also taken steps to highlight Chinese hostility and has strengthened security connections with states that share similar views by establishing new EDCA sites and collaborating on patrols. In the midst of China’s growing influence in the wider South China Sea, the Marcos Jr. administration has been exhibiting its dedication to safeguarding the West Philippine Sea through the application of international law and asserting Manila’s sovereignty and sovereign rights over the marine domain. In addition, Manila has strengthened its relationships with like-minded conventional and non-traditional partners who share similar objectives by demonstrating its intention to take a more active role in maintaining the Indo-Pacific region’s maritime domain as free, open, and rules-based.
Additional encouragement and backing are required to advance and carry out the Arbitral Award because the Marcos administration is adamant about its claims in the South China Sea. The Maritime Zone Bill is passed, it will provide the Philippines sovereign rights over its maritime zones, establish those zones under its authority, and enable its security sector to protect the interests of the country.
Finally, in order to support its marine interests, the nation needs to enlist the aid of its partner states. Vice President Kamala Harris’s visit boosted American attempts to improve maritime cooperation in Southeast Asia by a number of initiatives. Furthermore, several external players have started their own projects and policies for maritime cooperation and have indicated interest in assisting marine operations in the region, such as the EU and the Quad. To increase its maritime capabilities and capacity, the Philippines is capitalizing on these interests.
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