“The Idea of a Liberal Peace Has Had Its Day” — Sir Lawrence Freedman on the Changing Architecture of Global Order

Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman, Emeritus Professor of War Studies, King’s College London

In this insightful exchange with Diplomatist, Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman, Emeritus Professor of War Studies at King’s College London, reflects on how strategy and statecraft are being redefined in an era of blurred battle lines and fractured global order. Drawing on his decades-long scholarship—from the nuclear anxieties of the Cold War to today’s hybrid conflicts—he examines the limits of deterrence, the evolution of modern warfare, and the fading certainties of liberal peacebuilding. Sir Lawrence also offers a nuanced perspective on India’s strategic posture, the rise of regional conflict management frameworks, and the reshaping of partnerships such as India–UK cooperation in the emerging Indo-Pacific landscape.

Your career has spanned decades of strategic thinking from the Cold War to Ukraine. As we move further into the 21st century, what do you believe is the most under-appreciated strategic shift in how states prepare for war and peace?

During the Cold War strategic thinking was dominated by the possibility of a war between the US and Soviet led alliances. The big issue in discussions of such a war was not so much whether it would ‘go nuclear’, as it tended to be taken for granted that it would, but at what point and to what extent it would do so. In practice nobody was keen to find out and, after the great crises of 1961 (Berlin) and 1962 (Cuba), there was no obvious dynamic towards a major war. Cautioned ruled and scholars began to talk about the ‘Long Peace.’ This was said to cover the decades since World War 2. Obviously much of the world had not been at peace, and there had been much death and destruction, but World War 3 was avoided – and continues to be avoided. This meant that, at least in the West, the framework for thinking about major war was deterrence. What must be done to convince potential adversaries that the costs of aggression would exceed the gains.

This is still the mind-set in the West. The security paradigm remains one of deterrence. When it comes to a potential war between the great powers, especially if nuclear weapons might be involved, then deterrence as traditionally understood is still relevant. But the conflicts in which countries have been involved since the end of the Cold War have been many and various. There can be deterrent effects with terrorism and cyberattacks but the challenges they pose require a much wider repertoire of strategies. Russia has tried to use deterrence to limit Western support for Ukraine and at one level has succeeded, in that NATO countries have not committed forces directly in support of Kyiv. Yet this example also shows the limits of deterrence threats if used too promiscuously as they have limited credibility. Moscow issued dire warnings about all sorts of potential developments – from Sweden and Finland joining NATO, to the provision of tanks and aircraft and long-range missiles, to facilitating attacks on targets in Russia. Some of these led to hesitation but in the end the threats were all ignored and they were then not followed through.

Now Russia is acting in the ‘grey zone’ against the West – with drones over airports, sabotage, cyber attacks etc. These are acts that require a response. What is becoming apparent is that deterrence strategies work best in relatively stable situations but less well as matters become more dynamic.

 

In your book Strategy: A History, you trace how strategy has evolved. How would you define a 21st-century strategic mindset compared to the 20th-century paradigms of state versus state? What new metrics of success should we be tracking?

There is still a lot of state-to-state conflict so those issues have not gone away. The big difference is that there are now many more states as a result of decolonisation and the break-up of multi-national states like Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. In addition many of the new states have contested borders, fragile economies, and unsettled social and political systems. In these circumstances the concept of an ‘international order’ about which international relations theorists have written seems only possible at a high level. Around the world forms of disorder are common even normal, to the extent that individuals and societies must learn to adapt to these conditions in order to cope.

This creates a tension when it comes to engaging with areas of conflict. On the one hand continuing conflict within a state usually reverberates beyond its borders – whether with refugee flows or in trafficking of weapons and drugs as well as people. On the other hand recent experience warns of the difficulty of intervening in these conflicts. It is possible to make matters worse rather than better, and get bogged down. It is notable that in recent years as certain conflicts have demanded international attention – Ukraine and Gaza – others have been neglected, especially in Africa. I suspect that the forms of humanitarian action, conflict resolution and peacekeeping that became popular during the 1990s, and to a degree were effective, will attract less interest in the future. For many countries the strategic task will be to insulate them selves from the tragedies of others and contain their effects.

 

India is increasingly projecting both economic and military power within the region and beyond. From your vantage point, how should India think about strategy and deterrence in ways that are distinct from the traditional Western model?

India has its own strategic culture and traditions. It also shares some features of Western military practice including civilian control of the military. Military operations have certain requirements – intelligence, logistics, command, firepower, mobility and so on.  Different states with different traditions may handle these questions differently but in the end their options are going to be shaped by their capabilities and the conditions in which they are fighting. India’s perspectives will be influenced by the country’s size, borders, degree of urbanisation and internal lines of communication, relationship to the ocean. It is going to be distinctive from a small, compact, and largely landlocked country. Its approach to crisis management will equally be shaped by the nature of its opponents and rivals and the potential harm that they can do. It will also reflect values and priorities. Which is to say that strategy is a response to circumstances as much as theories. All military strategies end up addressing similar issues but how they do so depends on context.

 

You have written on how wars rarely go according to plan. With the rise of hybrid conflict, cyber, and geopolitical competition beyond violence, do you believe the category of “war” itself needs reframing for modern times? If so, how?

This is a very big issue and is much debated. My view is that the category of ‘war’ is best kept for conflicts involving deadly violence. I don’t think states have to be involved for it to be a war, as with fights between criminal gangs or armed militias. Of course it is possible to talk about economic or cultural wars but these are metaphors. They are not real wars, and it can be dangerous for them to be viewed as such, as it may encourage militarised responses. That does not mean that the boundaries of war are straightforward. It is clearly not the case that war can be kept self-contained, fought between armies well away from civil society. Anything to do with transport, energy, and communications can be military-related and so described as a legitimate target. With terrorism and guerrilla warfare, combatants will dress and live as civilians when they are not engaged in violence.

In preparation for war acts of sabotage may be directed against critical infrastructure or information campaigns mounted to ‘soften up‘ the enemy population. Other measures might be taken to cause division and disorientation in the target society. This is the ‘grey zone’. The conflict may not progress beyond this point in which it is not quite war but the acts gain their significance because they could be precursors to war. Such activities are not new – before the First World War there was much concern about enemy agents and the power of propaganda. There are more opportunities for these ‘grey zone’ activities these days in a networked age. Although they will be seen as hostile and possible precursors to war they create risks of escalation. Yet what can be signalled by staying in the grey zone and not moving to full-scale violence is that there is a  desire to display hostile intent without actually going to war. This can therefore signal weakness as much as strength. There is always a risk that a bluff may be called.

 

The liberal peace building project has faced many setbacks. As someone who has studied war and peace deeply, how do you envision peace-structures (institutions, diplomacy, coalitions) evolving in the next decade? Are there models outside the West that should shape this?

For reasons stated above I think it is fair to say that the idea of a ‘liberal peace’ has had its day. An underlying assumption was that democratic states do not fight each other but it soon transpired that this was not true with states transitioning to democracy. Moreover it could be encouraging when, as in the 1980s and 1990s, more states appeared to be embracing democracy. The democratic contraction of the past decade and the view that illiberalism can be a source of strength and good order has further undermined the notion. I don’t think that there is anymore a distinctive Western model for peace building. Ther experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq undermined confidence in those models that did exist. In addition the great multilateral institutions that were supposed to take responsibility for global governance have suffered from divisions and paralysis. The United States has lost interest in them. It has been the case for some time that regional organisations are best placed to take responsibility for managing conflicts in their neighbourhoods. Contributions to peacekeeping missions, for example in Africa, have been seen as ways of pursuing national interests as much as resolving the problem at hand. Non-western countries such as Qatar and the UAE  are increasingly taking a more active international role. I would say that the days when the world could be organised according to western ideas and through western-designed institutions has passed. The replacements do not follow a single model and are not always effective. They are likely to involve states with a direct interest in how a particular conflict is managed. It is of note that with the conflict in which the west is most invested at the moment – the Russo-Ukraine war – the talk is of a ‘coalition of the willing’ when it comes to reinforcing a ceasefire with assurances to Ukraine. I suspect that because of the weaknesses of organisations such as the UN  we are now in an age of ‘coalitions of the willing.’

 

India-UK relations have entered a new era of cooperation on defence, technology and trade. How might the UK leverage its legacy in strategy and conflict to build a strategic partnership with India that is genuinely equal and forward-looking?

I think there is bipartisan enthusiasm in the Uk for closer ties with India. Leaving aside the close historical ties, which is a complex legacy, a shared language and many shared values facilitate close working relations. The dynamism of India’s economy is appreciated while its role as a counterweight to China’s growing influence is also recognised. Less appreciated is India’s close relationship with Russia, despite the threats Moscow’s aggression poses to European security. So interests are by no means coincidental in all areas but they are now close enough for issues to be dealt with pragmatically. This can have elements of a strategic partnership but I suspect a more substantial foundation will be found in the increasingly prominent role of individuals with Indian backgrounds in the UK’s economic, political, and cultural life. n