An Indian Diplomat’s View of Africa and the Indo-Pacific

Amb Rajiv Bhatia, Distinguished Fellow at Gateway House and a former Ambassador/High Commissioner to Kenya, Mexico, Belize, Myanmar, South Africa, and Lesotho

Ambassador Rajiv Bhatia is one of India’s most respected diplomatic voices on Africa, the Indo-Pacific, and the evolving architecture of the Global South. With an illustrious career spanning Kenya, Mexico, Myanmar, South Africa, and Lesotho — and later as Director General of the Indian Council of World Affairs — he has long articulated the strategic intersections shaping India’s external engagement. In this conversation, he reflects on the widening arc of India’s Indo-Pacific vision, the growing salience of Africa, the complexities of Myanmar, and the urgent need for a more resource-backed, business-linked foreign policy. Drawing on decades of diplomatic practice and deep regional insight, Ambassador Bhatia offers a grounded yet forward-looking assessment of India’s choices in a world of shifting power balances.

1. In your recent writings, you argue that Africa’s eastern and southern flanks are part of India’s wider “Western Indo-Pacific.” Given China’s deepening footprint in the Indian Ocean and Africa, how should India prioritise its maritime security and Blue Economy engagements across Africa without overstretching its resources?

India’s vision of the Indo-Pacific indeed covers a vast area stretching from ‘Kilimanjaro to California’. The competition with China is a reality. India’s approach is to enhance its influence where it is present and create its presence where it is negligible or non-existent.

The priority areas are located near our home, including South Asia, the Indian Ocean island states, Eastern and Southern Africa, and Southeast Asia. New Delhi’s armoury includes a range of instruments to promote maritime security and deepen economic cooperation, including in the domain of the Blue Economy.

2. With the entry of the African Union into the G20 and India’s push to elevate South-South cooperation, what concrete mechanisms do you believe would most effectively integrate Indian private-sector investment, diaspora networks, and African institutions, beyond simply diplomatic rhetoric?

Yes, thanks to India’s pro-activism, the African Union is now a full member of the G20. Hopefully, it will make the most of this opportunity, especially at a time when South Africa is consecutively the fourth developing country, leading this important grouping. As the G20 presidency now shifts to the US, it would be beneficial if IBSA, the grouping comprising India, Brazil, and South Africa, invites Indonesia to join, thus creating the new IIBSA. This will be a representative combination capable of providing strong leadership to the Global South.

As for India’s economic diplomacy, it now needs to transcend a credit-oriented approach. More grants, more business-to-business deals, more investment, a greater push to job creation and industrialisation in Africa, and more technology transfer represent the pragmatic way forward.

3. The coup in Myanmar and the unfolding humanitarian and security crisis have placed India in a delicate position between its neighbourhood priorities and its Indo-Pacific ambitions. How should India recalibrate its Myanmar policy today, balancing strategic connectivity projects (like Kaladan/IMT) with human-rights and insurgency concerns?

The priority in the East is a safe, secure, and rapidly developing Northeast India, which demands a stable and peaceful eastern periphery, bordered by Bangladesh and Myanmar. We need friendly and cooperative ties with both, as well as positivity in the larger BIMSTEC region.

In Myanmar, New Delhi wisely pursues a modern version of the “two-track” policy, nurturing cordial relations with the military government while simultaneously supporting dialogue and benign cooperation with ethnic groups, especially those controlling the India-Myanmar border region.

This is a pragmatic policy approach that helps to promote our various strategic goals in that area. However, it may require some fine-tuning once the post-election scene becomes clearer.

4. Considering your experience both in South Africa/Kenya and in Southeast Asia, how do you compare India’s strategic posture in Africa versus the Indo-Pacific? What lessons can New Delhi draw from its Africa engagements (for instance, risk mitigation for Indian firms) that could apply to its Indo-Pacific strategy?

As we saw earlier, a part of Africa is covered by India’s Indo-Pacific strategy. The regions closer to India are more important than those farther away. The application of political, diplomatic, and economic tools of diplomacy varies accordingly. Within the Indo-Pacific region, the Indian Ocean will demand greater attention and more resources.

5. India’s “Indo-Pacific” narrative is expanding to include Africa and the western Indian Ocean. However, critics say this risks diluting strategic focus. Do you believe India should refine a narrower or broader definition of the Indo-Pacific, and what are the implications of either choice for India’s capability and credibility?

India has an expansive worldview and a rising ambition for its role in it. India aspires to be a leading global power. Therefore, a narrow definition will not work.

We need more financial resources that enable us to play a role commensurate with our ambitions. As our economy continues to develop, India will have more resources to expand mutually beneficial cooperation with its target constituencies.

6. India has made significant commitments, but actual trade and investment remain modest compared to the Chinese scale. What structural obstacles (such as financing, institutional presence, risk assessment) continue to hamper India’s Africa push, and how could the diplomacy-business interface be strengthened?

The Indian economy is about one-fifth the size of the Chinese economy. Therefore, a difference in scale is inevitable.

To address structural obstacles, we require a closed-door, high-level interaction involving representatives from government, business, and industry to assess the latest trends. Only then can a way forward be spelt out constructively.

7. In an era of strategic competition, soft-power tools matter as much as hard assets. Drawing from your years of diplomatic experience, how should India weave culture, connectivity, technology, and defence cooperation into a coherent strategy across the Indo-Pacific–Africa belt so that its foreign policy stays value-driven as well as interest-driven?

New Delhi has devised a measured formula with a focus on political engagement, pro-active economic diplomacy, technological cooperation, cultural and tourism connectivity, and mobilizing the support of the Diaspora.

What is now needed is a greater injection of financial resources that enables the nation to support its partners more effectively – not as charity, but through the promotion of trade, investment, technology transfer, education linkages, capacity building, and digital transformation.