In an era where global protectionist policies often prioritise narrow interests, a fundamental rethink of trade is vital. This is especially true for the Asia-Pacific region, where the World Food Programme (WFP) reports acute food insecurity affected 88 million people in 2024—a figure three times higher than in 2019. Climate disasters, conflict, and supply chain disruptions have deepened hunger and exposed flaws in food systems once considered resilient. A 2025 SDG Progress Report for Asia and the Pacific by the UN’s Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) reveals a regression from 2015 levels in key UN food security targets—a grave concern that must be prioritised to protect vulnerable groups. These trends challenge the region’s ability to meet Sustainable Development Goal 2 of “Zero Hunger” by 2030.
Amid this crisis, agricultural trade has emerged as an underappreciated stabiliser. By connecting surplus and deficit regions, it can cushion shocks, smooth price volatility, and improve dietary diversity. Yet these broad benefits only come alive when examined at sub-national levels.
Regional trade corridors can cushion food shocks and smooth price volatility
India’s Complex Position
India, as a key regional player, is not immune. Though often seen as self-sufficient, its agricultural sector has undergone major structural shifts. According to the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), between 2007–08 and 2023–24, India increased its total crop area by 20%, while production value rose by 49%, driven by a 24% increase in yield. As a predominantly agrarian economy, India also exports a range of agricultural products—about 10% of total exports—including cereals, fish, and tea.
Despite this, food insecurity persists, particularly in rural and low-income regions. The annual report from the Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare reveals that the Gross Value Added (GVA) by agriculture declined from 20.4% in 2020–21 to 17.7% in 2023–24. While the overall economy was expected to grow by 7.2% in 2023–24, the agricultural sector was projected to grow by just 1.4%. Persistent issues—such as poor farm-to-market connectivity and weak logistics infrastructure—continue to constrain productivity and equitable access.
Agricultural imports, including essential staples like vegetable oils and fruits, account for just 5% of India’s total imports. Although India maintains a cautious stance, international trade quietly helps fill gaps not met by local production. Trade with Myanmar, for instance, is crucial for meeting food needs in India’s Northeast region. Despite political turbulence, Myanmar remains a key supplier of pulses, vegetables, and fish. According to World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) data, these agricultural exports were worth $1.43 billion in 2023–24, constituting over 94% of Myanmar’s total trade with India.
The Australian Case Study
A contrasting case, Australia, demonstrates how deliberate trade design shapes outcomes. Despite arid conditions, it has built a globally competitive agri-export system, exporting 70% of its agricultural output to 169 countries.
Its trade with Papua New Guinea (PNG) is particularly instructive. Around 20% of Australia’s total exports to PNG are agricultural goods. In 2023–24, these exports were valued at over $340 million. Urban populations in PNG rely heavily on imported staples—underscoring Australia’s role as a key supplier in maintaining food availability, especially in non-rural areas.
Despite their vast differences, both trade corridors prove that regional exchange can enhance food security for importers and income for exporters—more so if designed around shared value, not extraction. Food security is not just a matter of imports and exports; it intersects deeply with socio-economic inequality.
Addressing Gender and Inequality
The Asia-Pacific accounts for more than half of the world’s food-insecure population, and the burden is not evenly shared. The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) states that food insecurity disproportionately affects women. In India, where women form a large part of the agricultural workforce, these dynamics are stark. According to India’s Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS), rural female labour force participation in agriculture rose from 71% in 2018–19 to nearly 77% by 2023–24. Yet, what appears as greater participation is often a consequence of male migration and unpaid labour on family farms.
Trade, if designed inclusively, can help address these inequities. Socioeconomic status, caste, and gender identity continue to shape who benefits. Both the India-Myanmar and Australia-PNG corridors offer policy cues for achieving greater food security. To make agri-trade truly inclusive, both India and Australia must deepen the gender lens in their policies. A regional trade architecture that works for all must start by recognising who is left out.
Policy Lessons for the Region
Inequities in food access and labour recognition are amplified where trade operates informally. For example, along India’s land border with Myanmar, a bilateral agreement permits only 62 tradable items and is constrained by poor infrastructure. This has pushed significant cross-border exchange into unofficial channels. While informality supports local livelihoods, it limits scalability and traceability—undermining broad-based food security. In contrast, Australia’s trade with PNG operates through formal channels, strengthened by regional cooperation.
India must modernise its bilateral agreement. Ceding control to informal channels weakens food security in border areas. Australia’s experience offers actionable insights for tackling informality.
First, supply chain gaps, dependence on middlemen, and climate disruptions weaken farm gate prices and overall resilience. Australia’s more streamlined producer-to-market systems, aided by cooperative models, show how market linkages can be improved.
Second, India faces substantial post-harvest losses—from 6–15% in fruits and vegetables—due to poor storage. In contrast, Australia has invested heavily in integrated logistics and storage infrastructure, helping reduce waste and maintain product quality. For example, their cold-chain storage capacity of 0.4 m3 of refrigerated warehouse per urban resident outpaces India’s.
Third, private investment in Indian agriculture remains low, largely due to the limited resources of small and marginal farmers, which constitutes 85% of total farmers in India. In contrast, Australia has steadily increased agricultural R&D funding, from $2.91 billion in 2022–23 to $2.98 billion in 2023–24, with private investment by large-scale agribusinesses and cooperatives now surpassing public contributions.
Fourth, Australia’s strong collaboration between industry, agricultural universities, and research institutions has enabled faster adaptation to emerging threats while still improving yields.
Lastly, Australia’s stringent biosecurity laws, though sometimes acting as non-tariff barriers, have helped build robust traceability systems, allowing targeted and efficient interventions when supply chains are disrupted.
Though operating in different contexts, the Australia-PNG model demonstrates how formalised frameworks—backed by infrastructure—can stabilise food access. For India, adapting (not adopting) these principles could bridge the gap between informal necessity and systemic resilience.
Conclusion
Agricultural trade is not a panacea, but it is far from peripheral. In an era of rising hunger, it offers a practical tool to stabilise food systems and strengthen regional ties. However, for trade to truly work for the people, it must be grounded in inclusive policies, regional cooperation, and deliberate attention to those most at risk of being left behind—especially smallholders and women. By 2030, Asia-Pacific’s hunger crisis will not be solved by trading more, but by trading better: formalising supply chains, targeting gender gaps, and designing policies where resilience means no one is left behind.
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