Upholding the “Shanghai spirit,” Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi reaffirmed India’s commitment to strategic autonomy and multipolarity based on greater action under three pillars—security, connectivity, and opportunity—at the 25th summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) held in Tianjin from 31 August to 1 September 2025.
Amid the tariff tensions with the US, Modi’s first visit to China in seven years calls for close scrutiny of the events, particularly in connection with India’s Indo-Pacific dreams that contrast with the SCO to some extent but are not exclusively intended to counter China. Although India supports a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific, which doesn’t antagonise its relations with China, its deep engagements with the US-led Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) somehow signal anti-China sentiments. Therefore, the central challenge for India lies in balancing its strategic stances between the Global West and the Global East while forwarding its aspirations of leading power in the Indo-Pacific.
The SCO Framework and India’s Indo-Pacific Contrast
The SCO was formed in 2001 as a Eurasian military, economic, and political organisation aimed at maintaining peace, stability, and security in the region. It is the largest regional organisation by population and geography, with India becoming its full member in 2017.
SCO is viewed as an anti-West framework, although it is not mentioned outright anywhere in its charter. Russia sees the SCO through the lens of an anti-US-led global order and seeks to promote an alternative order in which global power is shared by multiple states, or what is defined as a multipolar world order. On the other hand, China views the SCO as advancing its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a massive economic and infrastructure initiative of China started in 2013 under President Xi Jinping, and asserting influence on Eurasia. Iran’s membership in the SCO in 2023 further strengthened this reasoning, which shares turbulent relations and a troubled history with the US.
But unlike its SCO partners, India does not share this perspective. Being a close ally of the US in the Indo-Pacific and a member of the Quad, India has always been promoting the idea of an inclusive Indo-Pacific, as envisioned by PM Modi during the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2018 under the SAGAR (Security and Growth for All) Doctrine. This vision was also reflected when India hosted the 2023 virtual SCO Summit at New Delhi, with the theme as ‘Towards a SECURE SCO,’ representing the shared vision of Security, Economy and Trade, Connectivity, Unity, Respect for Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity, and Environment.
Forwarding this vision at the SCO Tianjin Summit 2025, India emphasised that peace, security, and stability remain key to progress and prosperity and called upon regional cooperation on counterterrorism, sustainable trade, and climate action, while carefully not being overtly anti-West like other SCO members, China and Russia.
Managing the Balance
India’s foreign policy has always advocated for strategic autonomy, i.e., the ability of a state to pursue its independent foreign policy without any outside pressure. India has endorsed this approach by being an independent player in global geopolitics. It does not view the Quad as a military alliance (as anchored by the West) nor a framework that is against any particular nation, particularly China, which defines the Quad as “Asian NATO.” India views the Quad as a minilateral alliance conceptualised to counter non-traditional security threats, including HADR operations, maritime domain awareness (MDA), and vaccine diplomacy, among others. Simultaneously, India refrains from using anti-West rhetoric in platforms like the SCO or BRICS, which do not include the West.
India also balances between the issues that come up in various forums. On the issues of counterterrorism and regional stability, India shares a common vision with the members of the SCO. But when it comes to infrastructure projects as part of the BRI, like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), India distances itself. It refuses to endorse the CPEC as it passes through the Gilgit-Baltistan area of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), a disputed territory between India and Pakistan.
In the wake of Western sanctions on India by the Trump administration, India is also looking for opportunities to expand its trade and energy ties with Russia and Central Asia. At the same time, its economic integration with the West is equally important, as India and the U.S. have bilateral trade valued at $131.84 billion in 2024-25, wherein technology partnership and defence cooperation remain critical. Hence, India’s stature to manage its legitimate interest in the Indo-Pacific and in the world at large is clearly evident to be guided by strategic autonomy and security and growth for all.
The Indo-Pacific Dream: Contrasting Agendas
India’s Indo-Pacific dream is rooted in its aspirations to become a “leading power” in the region. It envisions India as a prominent player in the maritime domain and a net security provider, capable of promoting peace, stability, and prosperity in the region.
Thus, India’s strategic posture in the region is largely focused on securing sea lanes, ensuring freedom of navigation and promoting openness and inclusiveness, and fostering mutual interest in the Indo-Pacific. Its close ties with Western-led frameworks like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) and the Quad can be seen as a part of external balancing against the backdrop of China’s expanding economic and military influence through BRI, connectivity corridors, and large naval presence via port and base access in the region.
At the same time, India’s presence in the SCO, an anti-Western framework of continental alliance within the Eurasian landmass, which mirrors the concerns of China and Russia against Western dominance and a Western-led global order, displays the acceptance of India’s capability and credibility to promote a multipolar and rule-based order. Although India’s participation in the SCO does little to advance its Indo-Pacific vision, it may serve as a framework that helps India to avoid relying only on Western partners in promoting security and stability in the Indo-Pacific as well as keep it connected to Eurasia.
Conclusion
The 2025 SCO Summit underscored how India is balancing between the West and the East, but it is not without risks. The historical border disputes between India and China complicate the two Asian giants’ convergence on various issues and engagements within the SCO framework. Both India and China aspire to be dominant players in the Indo-Pacific, implying that both will come to loggerheads with each other. The Pakistan factor is also very pertinent, as it is a part of the SCO and a nation with which India has hostile and complex relations. Pakistan uses the SCO to internationalise its grievances against India, often placing India in a difficult position.
The China-Pakistan relations also put India in an uncomfortable situation, as exemplified by the recent Pahalgam attack and the subsequent Operation Sindoor, in which Pakistan reportedly used Chinese-supplied platforms like the JF-17 and J-10 fighter jets, HQ-9 air defence systems, and satellite-based ISR capabilities. Thus, India must constantly assure its Western partners that its engagement with SCO will not dilute its Indo-Pacific commitments, while at the same time also building trust among its SCO partners that the Indo-Pacific vision is intended for security and growth for all and not designed for containment purposes.
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