In a strategic move to look in the eye, India hits back with a strong statement at Donald Trump’s unjustified tariffs and signals no compromise with the national interest. In the statement, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs condemned the United States of America and the European Union over Trump’s declaration of twenty-five percent tariffs along with penalties on India for importing oil from Russia, a key adversary of the U.S., amid the Russia-Ukraine war. In a latest retaliatory move, Trump has now hit back at India, with the imposition of fifty percent tariff on crude oil imports from Russia that will come into effect from August 27. These escalatory tariffs of the Trump 2.0 administration have raised several questions on the limits of strategic partnerships and the Indo-Pacific vision, as envisaged by the U.S.
Tariffs, Contradictions, and Strategic Autonomy
The Ministry’s statement pointed out that India’s oil imports are based on market factors and aimed to ensure the energy security of the nation. India began trading oil with Russia after the commencement of the Ukraine conflict, as the traditional supplies of India, i.e. from the Middle East and Africa, were diverted to Europe, as Europe voluntarily cut off the purchases from Russia in the wake of the war. The statement further highlighted that while the U.S. penalises India for maintaining trade relations with Russia, it continues to engage with Russia, importing uranium hexafluoride for its nuclear industry, palladium for its EV industry, fertilisers, as well as chemicals. This episode reveals stark contradictions in the U.S. Indo-Pacific vision and its treatment of strategic partners like India.
The Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision (FOIP) was officially articulated in 2017 by then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, which aimed to reinforce a rules-based regional order rooted in principles such as freedom of navigation, sovereignty, and economic openness. It signifies the right of all nations to exercise legitimate sovereign rights without external coercion. India is one of the key partners in the U.S. vision, as evident in the revitalisation of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) under the Trump 1.0 administration, along with Australia and Japan. Thus, the imposition of tariffs on India, a key democratic partner actively engaged in humanitarian aid, security, and infrastructure development, sends a signal to the rest of the world that economic coercion remains embedded in the U.S. foreign policy despite the rhetoric of mutual respect and partnership.
The double standards on the part of the U.S. raise questions about the credibility of its global leadership. It also gives mixed signals to the countries in the Indo-Pacific, which seek a balanced, multipolar engagement. While on one hand, it seeks to isolate Russia from the global map, on the other hand, it is maintaining trade relations by importing niche products from Russia to protect its own domestic industries. At the same time, it is threatening India to make pragmatic choices based on its economic and energy needs.
In a world marked by global shocks and inflation, India’s trade with Russia is realpolitik, which holds that national interest takes precedence. This understanding is also well established in External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s book, titled ‘The India Way’, where he highlights India’s dedication to strategic autonomy, underscoring the importance of diversifying partnerships rather than relying on a single ally.
The U.S. economic coercion is not a new technique; it has been used by powerful nations, and even this has also been pursued by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on smaller countries time and again. However, applying this model to India is shortsighted as, unlike other U.S. allies, India does not receive troop commitments or U.S. subsidies and is also not bound by any collective defence agreements. India is one of the largest democracies and fastest-growing economies of the world, which engages in the Indo-Pacific on a range of issues, from combating piracy to advancing vaccine diplomacy and regional connectivity. Its cooperation is voluntary, strategic, and issue-based. The assumption of the U.S. that economic coercion will force India to change its foreign policy position and strategic autonomy posture is wrong.
Implications for the Indo-Pacific Partnership
The impact of these tariffs is not merely economic; they are strategically destructive as well. India and the U.S. have multiple engagements in the Indo-Pacific together, ranging from economic frameworks like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) to security frameworks like the Quad. The U.S. sees India as a state that has the potential to balance the growing clout of China, an assertive and expansionist power in the region. Moreover, the fundamental principles of FOIP are based on mutual respect and non-coercive cooperation. If India is punished for pursuing its energy relations based on its national interest, it raises questions on the credibility and sustainability of frameworks like the Quad, which are built on convergence rather than coercion.
Moreover, the U.S. moves may inadvertently boost China’s narrative that the U.S. uses alliances as tools of manipulation rather than as genuine partnerships. This could undercut collective efforts to promote regional infrastructure, transparent supply chains, and maritime stability.
This is not an isolated case. India’s broader foreign policy reflects a delicate balancing act, maintaining ties with the U.S., Russia, and the EU, while leading initiatives in the Global South and deepening engagement in multilateral platforms like BRICS, SCO, and BIMSTEC. Punishing India for this balance not only fails to acknowledge its unique geostrategic position in the Indo-Pacific region stretching from Africa to America but also weakens the very multipolarity that Washington claims to support in the Indo-Pacific.
Conclusion: Choosing Cooperation Over Coercion
If the U.S. is sincere about cultivating a free and open Indo-Pacific, it must distinguish between coercion and cooperation. Tariffs, penalties, and public finger-pointing may serve short-term political optics, but they damage long-term trust, especially with nations that value sovereignty and strategic autonomy.
India is not a junior partner in the Indo-Pacific. It is an emerging leading power in the region with growing global responsibilities and aspirations. Recognising this role requires respectful engagement, not retaliatory tariffs.
Leave a Reply