Recent developments in the Red Sea have seen escalating Houthi attacks on shipping vessels, causing significant disruption to global trade and raising concerns about regional instability. These attacks, which began in November 2023, have prompted major shipping companies to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, increasing costs and transit times. In addition to the economic impact, a ship carrying hazardous fertiliser poses a serious threat to the Red Sea ecosystem.
The Red Sea crisis began on October 19, 2023, when the Iran-backed Houthi movement in Yemen launched missiles and armed drones at Israel. Since then, the Houthis have seized and attacked dozens of merchant and naval vessels in the Red Sea. This crisis is closely linked to the Israel-Hamas war and the broader Israel-Iran proxy conflict.
The Red Sea is a crucial maritime chokepoint, bounded by two narrow passages: the Suez Canal in the north (Egypt) and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait in the south. These are key strategic maritime zones and are currently the epicentre of Houthi attacks. Estimates suggest that around 12% to 15% of global trade, and approximately 30% of global container traffic, pass through this critical sea route.
The Red Sea and Gulf of Aden region comprises Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somaliland, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. Foreign military deployment in the region began intensifying around 2007–08. Since then, major regional and global powers have sent their navies, established military bases, and expanded their strategic presence. These include the U.S., Russia, India, Japan, South Korea, the European Union, Turkey, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. Djibouti hosts military bases from the U.S., China, France, and Japan, while Eritrea, Sudan, and Somaliland have welcomed countries interested in building naval bases—turning the Red Sea into a proxy battlefield.
The rise of the Houthis has been significantly bolstered by Iranian support, including military training, weapons manufacturing technology, and expertise in political and information warfare. Iran’s asymmetric strategy has helped the Houthis gain military prominence while allowing Tehran plausible deniability. However, while Iran remains a critical enabler, the Houthis are not directly controlled by Tehran. They have developed their own regional ambitions, aligning with but remaining independent of Iran’s broader objectives.
In response to the increasing threat to regional stability and global trade, Operation Prosperity Guardian, led by the U.S., was launched on December 18, 2023. U.S. Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin announced the creation of an international maritime security force to counter threats posed by the Houthis to international maritime trade.
Operation Aspides (EUNAVFOR Aspides) is the EU’s military operation launched in response to Houthi attacks on international shipping. Named after the Greek word for “shields,” unlike the U.S.-led initiative, this mission is purely defensive—focused on increasing maritime surveillance, escorting merchant vessels, and defending against strikes.
Israel plays a low-profile yet strategic role in the Red Sea, emphasising maritime intelligence and covert operations to counter Iranian influence and the Houthi threat. Its southern port, Eilat, remains on high alert. Although Tel Aviv avoids direct naval deployment, it shares surveillance intelligence with the U.S. and Gulf allies to secure the Red Sea trade route.
As military tensions escalate, insurance premiums for vessels navigating the Red Sea have surged. Many companies—such as Maersk, MSC, and BP—are reconsidering alternative routes, including sailing around Africa via the Cape of Good Hope, which adds weeks to transit times and increases fuel costs. The disruption is already contributing to higher consumer prices and delays in global supply chains.
With multiple naval forces operating in a confined maritime space, the risk of miscalculation or accidental confrontation is high. The increased U.S.-led naval presence, growing Chinese influence, and regional rivalries could turn the Red Sea into a high-risk zone for potential conflicts, further destabilising global trade.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is the primary international legal framework governing maritime activities in the Red Sea. However, its effectiveness in addressing the recent Houthi attacks is being questioned. While UNCLOS establishes principles of freedom of navigation and state jurisdiction over maritime zones, the ongoing attacks highlight the limitations of existing legal frameworks in deterring non-state actors and addressing asymmetric warfare tactics.
Since late 2023, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states—especially Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar—have engaged in a multipolar pivot. While the GCC continues to rely on the U.S. for maritime security (e.g., Operation Prosperity Guardian), it is also expanding ties with China. Trade with China is surging, and Chinese companies are investing in Gulf ports such as Yanbu, Jizan, and Jeddah. BRICS+ membership offers the GCC states financial hedging options.
GCC leaders describe the region as a “bridge for peace,” committed to partnerships with both the U.S. and China. China maintains a non-Western maritime presence through anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden and strategic investments like the Duqm port in Oman, signalling its growing yet cautious naval reach into Red Sea routes.
The Saudi-Emirati alliance has advanced a major infrastructure strategy that includes developing port cities and military installations on both sides of the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia launched the Red Sea Project and the NEOM mega-port to enhance its geo-economic clout. The UAE has invested in ports in Assab (Eritrea), Berbera (Somaliland), and Bosaso (Puntland) under DP World’s logistics expansion plans.
Turkey has pursued an active role in the Horn of Africa, building infrastructure in Mogadishu (Somalia) and signing military cooperation agreements. It has extended development aid and soft-power diplomacy through TIKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency). Turkey’s Red Sea expansion is partly driven by its neo-Ottoman foreign policy and the need to secure energy routes.
The Red Sea is central to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), especially for securing energy supply lines and trade routes to Europe. China established its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017, tied to the Chinese-operated port of Doraleh. Chinese firms, including COSCO and CMPort, have invested in ports from Egypt to Sudan and Kenya.
Russia signed an agreement to establish a naval base in Port Sudan. It seeks access to warm waters, arms deals, and security cooperation to balance the U.S. and French presence. Russia’s military diplomacy includes Wagner-linked private contractors in Sudan and Libya to secure influence.
The U.S. maintains Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, its largest base in Africa, overseeing anti-terror and maritime security operations. It supports capacity-building in partner states (Egypt, Kenya) and conducts counter-piracy missions across the Gulf.
The EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) operates Operation Atalanta, focused on piracy suppression and shipping lane security. The EU has funded port modernisation and maritime training missions in Djibouti, Kenya, and Somalia.
India has enhanced engagement through security dialogues with Gulf states and Africa, port investment talks in Djibouti and Eritrea, and naval deployments in the western Indian Ocean. The SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) doctrine frames India’s maritime outreach, including cooperation on anti-piracy and freedom of navigation. India aims to balance Chinese influence and protect its trade routes through soft power, naval diplomacy, and port development support.
Thus, the Red Sea is rapidly evolving into a multinational geopolitical theatre.
The growing confrontation in the Red Sea is not merely military—it is political, legal, and symbolic. The region has become a frontline in a wider struggle for justice, sovereignty, and accountability. Over 12% of global trade and 30% of global container traffic transit through the Red Sea, making it one of the world’s most vital maritime corridors.
Since 2023, over 100 Houthi-claimed drone and missile attacks have targeted vessels, prompting the U.S.-led Operation Prosperity Guardian and increased naval development by China, France, and Iran. With Saudi Arabia leasing Sudanese ports, the UAE expanding into Perim Island and Assab, and Israel activating Eilat’s port defence, the Red Sea is witnessing intensified “base politics” and power projection.
Without a de-escalatory framework and coordinated maritime rules management, this escalation could jeopardise both global commerce and regional stability.
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