As the Indian government has started to go on the diplomatic offensive by rallying against both China and Pakistan following the recent Operation Sindhoor, the recently held Quad External Affairs meeting assumes significance.
The Quad foreign ministers’ meeting served as a precursor to the scheduled Quad summit later this year. The ministers’ summit followed the earlier Defence Ministers’ meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), where India pushed for a concrete declaration against terrorism sponsored by Pakistan.
Earlier, the Secretary of State of the United States and the Foreign Ministers of Australia, India, and Japan met in Washington, D.C. on July 1, 2025, for the 10th Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting.
As part of the summit, the ministers announced key initiatives to strengthen maritime and transnational security, economic prosperity, critical and emerging technologies, and support for humanitarian assistance and emergency response across the region.
The original Quadrilateral Security Initiative was a proposed maritime alliance that included the United States, Japan, and Australia, with India initially seen as a reluctant partner. This perception has changed in recent times. It has been rebranded as “Quad 2.0” because India is now more active in the alliance, including in the western Pacific, and is much more embedded in U.S. and Australian maritime strategic thinking on the Indo-Pacific.
Quad 2.0 focuses on the Indo-Pacific, acknowledging that China has concentrated on expanding the South Sea Fleet rather than the North and East Sea Fleets over the past ten years, warranting an adjustment in focus to the broader Indo-Pacific concept, as opposed to the Asia-Pacific, which excludes the western Indian Ocean.
The operational significance of Quad 2.0 will be reflected in the cooperation between various U.S. operational commands and those of the proposed maritime partners.
The Indian Navy, which is focusing on maritime assertiveness, can be expected to increase its cooperation with the U.S. Central, African, and Pacific Commands, bringing it in line with Japan and Australia.
Another important aspect that could be fast-tracked with closer cooperation is India’s quest to acquire U.S. technology for its aircraft carriers. It is understood that the Indian Navy’s request for the supply of the Electromagnetic Launch System (EMALS), built by General Atomics for its future aircraft carriers, has reportedly been accepted by the U.S. administration.
India is also expected to undertake joint projects with Japan and the United States to install sound surveillance sensors in the vicinity of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. This is an important element in controlling the Indian Ocean operations of China’s Southern Fleet and monitoring its activities. Australia could join the installation of these sensors, as it would help Canberra project its influence in the Indian Ocean and assist in tracking the movements of Chinese submarines in the wider Indo-Pacific, a task facilitated by Japan as well.
India may also push for a revival of the Obama-era “Pivot” or “Rebalance” to Asia strategy, which aimed to shift the U.S. military’s focus away from the Middle East and concentrate maximum naval assets to ring-fence China in its immediate neighbourhood. This strategy stems from the U.S. Grand Strategy based on Nicholas Spykman’s geostrategic vision. Spykman emphasised that the U.S. needed partners in the Rimland to counter the rise of the Heartland (Soviet Union) and the Middle Kingdom (China).
The Quad continues to evolve as a robust Indo-Pacific strategy. Successive summit meetings and the increasing sophistication of the Malabar Exercise demonstrate how the Quad has coalesced around a unified strategic vision, driven by mutual security objectives and the need to balance China’s aspirations of dominance in the Indo-Pacific region.
The intricate, sophisticated, and growing defence relations between the Quad nations, at bilateral and trilateral levels, further highlight the Quad’s expanding strategic role.
The Quad was originally conceived during an August 2007 meeting in Manila, held on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), between the Prime Ministers of India, Japan, and Australia, and the Vice President of the United States.
It was widely seen as a security forum to rein in Chinese belligerence in the Indo-Pacific and to re-establish a rules-based international order to maintain open sea lanes of communication.
However, the Chinese government responded angrily to the 2007 Malabar Exercise, issuing formal diplomatic protests. Australia quickly backtracked from the Quad and made its intention clear not to participate in future Malabar exercises.
Quad 1.0 thus lost steam and faded away. The U.S., India, and Japan continued to conduct trilateral exercises in the absence of Australia until 2020.
The military alliance between the U.S., India, Japan, and Australia could eventually evolve into a defence alliance similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), with a subtle difference from the earlier Quad 1.0, which was primarily a maritime exercise focused on naval strategy. Quad 2.0, however, is a politico-military strategy with a deeper maritime military subset.
In conclusion, it is expected that India will assert itself further in the Quad arena by expanding the scope and ambition of the summit, reflected most prominently in the upcoming Quad Summit scheduled for September in India.
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