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India to step up strategic antenna towards Cook Islands as a part of Pacific Islands geopolitics

by Balaji Chandramohan - 24 July, 2025, 12:00 364 Views 0 Comment

As the Cook Islands is set to observe 60 years of being in free association with New Zealand on August 4th this year, the geopolitical significance of the event can’t be overlooked. The event will be viewed with interest by countries from the United States, China, India, New Zealand, Australia, and even by France.

New Zealand’s top political leaders skipping the Cook Islands’ 60th Constitution anniversary, seen as a rebuke over closer ties with China, has sparked widespread disappointment and calls for the Cook Islands government to mend relations. The confirmation that none of the senior New Zealand Government leaders will attend the Cook Islands’ 60th self-governance anniversary on August 4th has ignited public and political backlash.

New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon and Foreign Minister Winston Peters will not attend the milestone event in Rarotonga, which will celebrate the Cook Islands’ six decades of self-governance in free association with NZ. Instead, New Zealand will be represented by its Governor-General Dame Cindy Kiro and her husband Dr. Richard Davies, a diplomatic move seen by many as a clear message of discontent following the Cook Islands’ recent deepening ties with China.

Earlier, Mark Brown’s trip to China focused on the “Joint Action Plan for a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership”, which was considered a game changer in the Pacific Islands geopolitics. Under their 60-year-old agreement, the Cook Islands is self-governing in “free association” with New Zealand. The two countries are expected to consult each other over issues of defence and security.

Earlier, Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown left Rarotonga for Beijing with his delegation on a state visit from February 10–14 this year. Brown’s visit included the signing of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, a move that has drawn concerns from New Zealand due to a “lack of consultation.”

The Cook Islands operates in free association with New Zealand. The country governs its own affairs, but New Zealand provides assistance with foreign affairs (upon request), disaster relief, and defence.

The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership assumes more significance from Wellington’s point of view as the New Zealand Defence White Paper 2010 reaffirmed New Zealand’s commitment to the Pacific Islands. Further, New Zealand’s strategic commitment to the Cook Islands and its outreach to the Pacific Islands was confirmed by the 2016 Defence White Paper.

In that respect, the 2016 White Paper underlined the importance of the Navy’s Doctrine 1997, though, much like its trans-Tasman counterpart, there is no explicit mention of terms such as command of the sea or a spelling out of the much-needed oceanic policy.

On the other hand, while the Cook Islands is exploring the possibility of a national passport, Niue, which happens to be another protectorate in the Pacific Islands, does not plan to follow suit. Like the Cook Islands, Niue operates in free association with New Zealand, where its people hold New Zealand passports and citizenship. Niue Prime Minister Dalton Tagelagi affirmed the respect for their current constitutional arrangement with New Zealand and has no plans to pursue a national passport at this time.

It’s understood that the Cook Islands’ self-assertion is a subset of the wider geopolitics of the Pacific Islands. There are geopolitical differences between the Melanesian (in the mid-southwest Pacific Rim), Micronesian (on the lower northwestern Pacific Rim), and Polynesian (comprised by a geographic triangle extending from Hawai’i in the north to Easter Island in the southeast and New Zealand in the southwest Pacific) blocs.

It’s understood that geopolitically, the Cook Islands is a Polynesian country, with membership in regional organisations such as the Polynesian Spearhead Group and the Pacific Islands Forum, and it is a founding member of the Forum.

Also, the Polynesian countries have been more wary of Beijing’s expanding profile in the region. In fact, in the recently concluded Samoa elections, the incumbent largely lost because of leaning towards Beijing’s interest in the Polynesian country. The Samoan election and further political drama were largely condemned by many Polynesian countries, including by the Cook Islands.

These incidents are all looked at with interest by strategic players in the region, including India. But as China continues to press its weight in the Pacific, the strategic stakes have never been higher.

The Solomon Islands’ security agreement followed its 2019 decision to drop recognition of Taiwan and instead acknowledge Beijing as the sole legitimate government of China. Similarly, Kiribati also switched diplomatic allegiance from Taiwan to China in 2019. Since then, China has funded various infrastructure projects in Kiribati, including road improvements and solar energy installations. In January 2020, Kiribati also joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

The US, meanwhile, has also tried to step up — setting up embassies in Kiribati, Tonga, the Cook Islands, and Niue over the past two years.

The Cook Islands, along with 13 other small Pacific nations, excluding New Zealand and Australia, hold strategic value due to their geographic location. They host a population of less than 13 million but cover 15 percent of the planet’s surface. Scattered over vast stretches of the Pacific Ocean, these islands are critical for maritime routes, military positioning, and geopolitical influence.

Meanwhile, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to the Pacific Islands in May 2022 was viewed with a lot of interest in New Delhi’s strategic circle, which to a large extent prompted India to increase its foothold in the region. On the other hand, the other countries in the region rejected Beijing’s security deal, citing that it would infringe on the Pacific Islands’ sovereignty.

Also, India viewed the recent political developments in Fiji, Samoa, and the Cook Islands with a lot of interest, as the influence of China was specifically felt.

On the other hand, as India wishes to extend its influence in the Pacific Islands and South Pacific, it will develop its relations both in the Polynesian and Melanesian countries. To start with, earlier, the Cook Islands were accredited to the Indian High Commission based in Fiji. It’s understood that Fiji is the hub of the Melanesian countries.

With the above background, India wishes to open diplomatic missions in several countries of the South Pacific, including Samoa and Tonga (which are currently served from Wellington and Suva, respectively). The increased presence and India’s desire to enhance its influence in the Pacific Islands Forum could be motivational.

This was emphasised in the state visit of the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Fiji in November 2014, soon after his visit to Australia. The impetus to take New Delhi’s reach to the Pacific Islands countries was visible during this visit, since apart from the diplomatic and cultural overtones, the military dimensions of the visit could not be ignored.

In conclusion, it’s understood that the August 4th event this year will be a game changer in the political landscape of the Pacific Islands and also in the wider Indo-Pacific region.

Balaji Chandramohan
Author is a member of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses. He has worked as a journalist in India and New Zealand.
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