Prime Minister of New Zealand, Rt Hon Christopher Luxon, is on an Official Visit to India from 16-20 March 2025. Prime Minister Luxon, who is on his first visit to India in his current capacity, is visiting New Delhi and Mumbai. He is the Chief Guest at the annual Raisina Dialogue 2025.
This visit is expected to enhance the strategic partnership between New Delhi and Wellington which may have wider strategic implications in the Pacific Islands geopolitics.
For its part, after the end of the Cold War, India shed its ideological trappings and now seeks to conduct its bilateral relations not only on shared values of democracy but also to incorporate notions of realpolitik and a sound understanding of the present geo-political changes.
The visit assumes significance as India has also started to show pronounced interest in the Pacific Islands’ affairs. As a fact, India decided to accredit the Cook Islands diplomatic mission to Wellington rather than from Fiji.
In the above context, China has enhanced its strategic scope in the Pacific Islands with the recent signing of the strategic partnership between the Cook Islands and China.
On the other hand, India’s previous position of non-alignment and its ambiguous stance on nuclear disarmament never sat comfortably in Wellington. On the other hand, both India and New Zealand have understood the value of connecting with a shared Commonwealth history as a part of their foreign policy endeavours.
It is no longer a secret that, with its emergence as a great power in the Indo-Pacific, India could lead global multi-lateral platforms such as Commonwealth countries and even come to assume a leadership role among English-speaking democracies.
New Zealand, like India and Australia, has understood the changing strategic outlook in the Indo-Pacific. China’s emergence as a major power was reflected in the Defence White Paper released in November 2010
India has never explicitly stated that it wishes to form some sort of alliance with democratic nations against China. Neither does New Zealand wish to be part of some anti-Beijing alliance, particularly considering that it signed a Free Trade Agreement with China in April 2008 – the first Western country to do so.
However, a diplomatic initiative between two democratic countries which have shared values and common interests in the Indo-Pacific region should be explored further. The challenge for India and New Zealand in forming an effective strategic relationship lies in finding a consensus within their domestic constituencies for greater strategic relationships with the United States in the years to come.
New Delhi has been quite reluctant to embrace a better strategic relationship with the United States too closely or even with Australia or New Zealand.
Part of the problem lies in the fact that, while India’s foreign policy orientation very much favours such a relationship, it is still reluctant to deepen the strategic relationship to the extent that it might include more frequent port calls by US warships or even the stationing of US troops on Indian soil This position may change with the forming of the open strategic alliance between US and India.
Such reluctance is understandable as, in a legacy of colonial rule, India still has a constituency which rails against the presence of any Western troops on its soil. Another part of the problem is that since China is India’s largest trading partner, New Delhi does not wish to antagonise Beijing by hosting US troops. Within Indian strategic circles, there has occasional talk of strategic autonomy or “NonAlignment II” as one way of keeping India out of any future US-China “Cold War”.
This, some think, will give New Delhi the diplomatic freedom to pursue its own ambitions. But, at some stage, Indian policymakers will need to have a nuanced debate on an effective, flexible overall strategy.
In some ways, New Zealand’s position is similar to that of India. Within New Zealand, there is a domestic constituency that does not favour a closer strategic relationship with the US. But with an evolving geopolitical order and Beijing’s increased assertiveness in the South China Sea and greater presence in the South Pacific, New Zealand is keen to deepen its strategic relationship with the US, including closer defence co-operation.
As part of India’s power projection efforts in the Indo-Pacific, New Delhi has decided to strengthen its Eastern Fleet in Vishakhapatnam and the tri-command service in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. In the future, Southeast Asian countries such as Singapore and Malaysia will increasingly look to India, as well as the United States, for security. This coincides with New Zealand’s interests in South-East Asia’s Indian Ocean littoral and its long-standing commitments under the Five Power Defence Agreement. India’s increased power projection in the region could benefit New Zealand’s strategic interests there, which tend to parallel those of Australia. For instance, both India and Indonesia have decided to enhance their counter-terrorism mechanisms and maritime strategic co-operation, the latter primarily with China in mind.
India and New Zealand have a lot in common: both countries have democratic institutions based on the Westminster parliamentary system, are members of the Commonwealth and have a keen interest in an international system that supports the rule of law.
From India’s point of view, having a partner in New Zealand provides an effective way to further its expanding strategic interests. It very much coincides with Wellington’s growing interest in the Indo-Pacific region. It should serve as a common thread for Indo-New Zealand relations in the future, although there will be challenges such as a consensus for their strategic relationships with the United States and occasional differences over the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
In conclusion, the scheduled state visit will be a game changer in the India and New Zealand strategic relations and in the overall geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific in general and for the Pacific Islands in particular.
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