As India starts re-organizing its military command matrix to deal with the external security challenges effectively, it will be interesting to see how this reconstitution will be perceived in the years to come and the sum effect it will have on New Delhi’s evolving Grand Strategy in general and maritime strategy in particular.
To start with, the momentum to change the command matrix to suit its security challenges started with the appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff, which was a game changer in India’s civil-military relations and pursuing effective inter-service cooperation, which will enable the formation of the theatre commands.
Earlier, India’s civil-military relations were composed of a three-tiered security system, which extends from the Cabinet level to that of the three service chiefs. At the apex was the Defense Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) under which was the Defense Minister’s Committee (DMC). (In 1978, the DCC became the Political Affairs Committee of the Cabinet).
At the third level was the Permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, in which the three service chiefs have formal equality despite enormous differences in the sizes of the forces and their respective share in the budget.
This structure, which excludes the service chiefs from apex decision-making structures, has remained intact over the decades even though this structure is no longer appropriate for contemporary India which is aspiring for a Great Power status.
The above has been somewhat compensated with the appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), which helps facilitate its Grand Strategy. India’s CDS as an institution will coordinate the jointness among the three services and provide a single-point military adviser to the civilian political-bureaucratic establishment.
China’s military modernization, under President Xi Jinping, has been marked by reforms that include the restructuring of the PLA into five theater commands: Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern, and Central. These reforms aim to improve joint operations and enhance the PLA’s capabilities for modern warfare, focusing on fast decision-making, integrated command systems, and coordination across all branches of the military. The theatre commands are strategically aligned with China’s security priorities, including regional conflicts, border stability, and global power projection
Theaterization of the command is understood to be a logical step to make the CDS more effective. Without an integrated system and a CDS, combat power (consisting of personnel and material) accretions by individual services remain fiefdoms without the ability to use their tremendous power as a single, war-fighting machine. In this context, it can be understood that theaterization will develop the necessary force multiplier by having better coordination among the services.
However integrating all three services into one common war theatre is a process which will involve extensive changes to the current India’s military command structure, and an empowered CDS could then prove to be a silver bullet for India’s Great Power status and evolving Grand Strategy.
As of now, Andaman and Nicobar is the only Tri-Command structure overseen by the Integrated Defence Staff. India’s military strength at present is evenly distributed among the three services, despite the fact that the Indian Navy’s stake runs deeper.
The initial proposal for India’s theatre command involved geographical commands: an Eastern Command responsible for China, South Asia, Southeast Asia and East Asia; a Western Command responsible for Pakistan, Central Asia and West Asia; and a Southern Command responsible for littoral Africa and the West Asia.
More theatre commands may be created as the scale and scope of military activities expand and it is likely that India will have five theatre commands.
As the debate has started on the Theatre Command, it is understood that India’s military command matrix will be organized as the Northern Command- along the border with China, the Western Command- along the border with Pakistan, the Peninsular Command, the Air Defence Command, and the Maritime Command, would be headed by commanders of Lieutenant General and equivalent ranks who would have operational control, while the service Chiefs would be tasked with mobilizing resources to the theatre commanders.
Further, to avoid complication, the Air Force’s assets across different commands would be placed under the Air Defence Command which would be tasked with defending the Indian airspace.
At present, India has 19 commands – six of the Indian Army, three of the Indian Navy, seven of the Indian Air Force, one tri-service command at Andaman and Nicobar Islands and the Strategic Forces Command (SFC).
It’s understood that the Air Force has issues with the theatrization of the command as the Air Force has five C-in-C level billets compared to six of the Army and three of the Navy with area responsibilities. Theatrization would result in the amalgamation of existing commands thereby cutting down their number from 14 to possibly four which made the Air Force oppose the theatre command.
On the other hand, the change in the Command matrix will provide the shift from the centralized Soviet-style rigid Command structure to an effective force which is capable of effective Joint Power-Projection.
The theatre command will be under the HQ IDS which will address India’s Continental security concerns and so address India’s expanding maritime profile. Therefore, the continental theatre is split into two theatres with one theatre responsible for the North (Northern Theatre Command- NTC) against China and a second theatre for the West (Western Theatre Command- WTC) against Pakistan.
India’s commitment to Indo-Pacific lends itself to a single theatre which due to reasons of threats from two nations could have two Maritime Commands located in the East and West and largely conform to the existing area of responsibility of the Western Naval Command and Eastern Naval Command.
These two commands could be part of a single Maritime theatre Command. But two factors work against singularity. First – the maritime vision is one of expanding capabilities to the waters beyond the Indian Ocean and that would make a single maritime theatre unwieldy.
Second, the permeability of external and internal threats demands that Theatre Commands share the internal continental space. Therefore, the two existing Western and Eastern Naval Commands are re-designated as South Western Theatre Command (SWTC) and South Eastern Theatre Command (SETC).
Each would be based on fleets, Area Headquarters of the Army and Operational Groups of the IAF and have tri-service Component Commanders with assets allotted by the HQ IDS. The existing Integrated Andaman & Nicobar Command will come under SETC.
Such a model will facilitate India’s image as a Great Power which of course will be facilitated by a Command Structure modelling both China and the United States. Such a re-arranged Command Structure will replicate the US military working under six theatre commands for its Global Command Responsibility while China in 2015 shunned seven regional commands. India will likely have five Theatre Commands.
The sum effect of these changes in force composition and deployment will allow India to develop a blue water joint force expeditionary capability that is increasingly oriented towards the Indo-Pacific as a priority area of operations.
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