In international relations, there are no permanent enemies and no permanent friends, only permanent interests. This adage by British statesman Lord Palmerston well captures the state of Bangladesh’s evolving relationship with Pakistan and India. With the change of regime in Dhaka, India and Bangladesh have changed from the thickest allies in South Asia to adversaries within a period of three months. The most notable sign of this is Bangladesh’s diplomatic thaw with its old nemesis – Pakistan.
Bangladesh and Pakistan were once part of the same nation. It is well documented how people in erstwhile East Pakistan (later Bangladesh) suffered while the governing class in West Pakistan turned a blind eye. Following the nine-month Liberation War in 1971, East Pakistan cut the umbilical cord and Bangladesh was born as an independent country with India’s moral and military support.
Bangladesh’s Pakistan and India policy since 1971: The relationship between Bangladesh and Pakistan was initially hostile and strained because of Pakistan’s resentment, which stemmed from the loss of territory. Pakistan’s “Hallstein doctrine” of cutting diplomatic ties with any nation that acknowledged Bangladesh’s sovereignty proved untenable, as most nations eventually established full diplomatic ties with Dhaka. The relationship became worse since Hasina took office as PM in 2009, primarily because of the Bangladeshi government’s decision to try and execute several right-wing Jamaat-e-Islami leaders such as Meir Qassim Ali, who were allegedly pro-Pakistani.
There was an explicit attempt to thaw relations when Imran Khan came to power in 2018. Not only was he critical of the 1971 actions of the Pakistani army, he also lauded Bangladesh’s economic accomplishments. In 2019, Bangladesh approved the appointment of a new Pakistani High Commissioner. A lot transpired between the two nations including a meeting between foreign ministers of both countries in 2022. However, nothing much materialized as any attempt by Islamabad to mend ties was stifled by Dhaka’s continued strong ties to Delhi.
On the other hand, relations with India had strengthened, particularly under Hasina’s government from 1996 to 2001 and again from 2009 until 2024, despite differences over issues like Teesta-river water distribution and border killings by BSF. Now the change of regime in Dhaka has presented Pakistan with a much-awaited strategic opportunity to mend its relationship with Bangladesh.
Politics of change and Delhi’s concerns: The 84-year-old Nobel laureate, Muhammad Yunus who took over as leader of Bangladesh’s new caretaker administration in August has been a prominent opponent of Hasina and her policies, which were fundamentally pro-India and anti-Pakistan. One major development in this regard has been the decision to initiate direct maritime connectivity between the two hostile Muslim-majority nations. In November, the MV Yuan Xian Fa Zhong, a Chinese cargo ship from Karachi, arrived in Chattogram (formerly Chittagong), for the first time since Bangladesh was formed in 1971. Interestingly, two months ago, Bangladesh is believed to have ordered 2,900 high-intensity projectiles, 40 tons of RDX explosives, 2,000 tank ammo units, and 40,000 rounds of artillery ammunition from Pakistan’s Ordnance Factories (POF). What is more alarming is that in September, Bangladesh removed the clause which required the port authorities to physically inspect cargo from Pakistan on arrival, adding to India’s worries.
Chittagong and Karachi ports are approximately 2,900 nautical miles apart – a distance usually covered in 10 to 12 days. However, the restrictive trade policy under Hasina required the cargo to be offloaded in Malaysia, Singapore, or Sri Lanka and then transferred to other ships headed for Bangladesh. Indian officials have been particularly watchful of the sea routes that connect Chittagong and Mongla Ports since the 2004 arms haul whereby a huge consignment of arms meant for ULFA and other rebel groups in India’s northeast were captured. Since then, Delhi has used its connection with Hasina to deter anti-India activity in the two ports.
In 2022, Bangladesh port authorities refused to let Pakistan’s newly commissioned Chinese-built frigate warship PNS Taimur, dock at Chittagong Port. Even though India obtained the operating rights to a terminal at Mongla port in 2023, Pakistan now has access to the port of Chittagong. It would thus be easier for Pakistani vessels to use the maritime routes leading to the two ports, without the physical inspection of cargo. Additionally, Islamabad has also granted free business and visit visas for Bangladeshis with a 48-hour processing time. Evidently, Dhaka is trying to de-hyphenate its Pakistan policy from India and build an independent relationship with Islamabad. The important question is whether the shift in foreign policy is guided by economic rationale or merely a shift in political posturing.
Under Sheikh Hasina’s leadership, India became Bangladesh’s top development partner, with a US$ 8 billion development portfolio. A significant aspect of the relationship between Bangladesh and India is trade. According to Ministry of Commerce data, India’s total trade in Bangladesh stood at US$ 12.9 billion in 2023-24. India is Bangladesh’s second largest import partner after China and Bangladesh is India’s largest trade partner in South Asia. Over the years, Delhi has relaxed its import policy with Bangladesh. Except for some narcotics, almost all Bangladeshi goods are now allowed duty-free entry into the Indian market. Is Pakistan in a position to offer these economic gains to Bangladesh? Other than antagonizing and poking India for its unwavering support to Sheikh Hasina, the Yunus government is not likely to make much headway by aligning itself with an economically and politically unstable country.
Although China is Bangladesh’s biggest trading partner and the countries share a strong economic relationship, scholars in Beijing have also shown apprehension about the new “pro-American” interim government. Yunus cannot afford to burn all bridges with Delhi if he really intends to keep his promise of building a new, democratic, and economically stable “new Bangladesh”.
Conclusion: Secular Bangladesh, with whom India shares its longest land border, has grown to be India’s closest friend and a powerful bulwark of India’s security objectives. New Delhi’s worries about a resurgence of Islamist extremism in Bangladesh that could target the country’s sizable Hindu population and support insurgent groups in northeastern India are not misplaced. Yunus is not essentially anti-India. However, he is certainly anti-Hasina. Even though Hasina’s presence in India is likely to remain a major roadblock in Delhi’s diplomacy with the new regime in Dhaka, India must try to resolve differences with the new government to avoid another “security front” opening up on its eastern border, besides China in the north and Pakistan in the west. The political dispensations in Delhi and Dhaka may not like each other many more, but they certainly need each other.
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