India has a good story to tell the world

In an insightful interview with Daniel S. Markey, Senior Advisor for South Asia at the United States Institute of Peace, he provides insights into India’s evolving role in U.S. foreign policy, its leadership potential within the Global South, and its strategic balancing act with China and the West.

Given your extensive experience with U.S. policy toward South Asia, how do you assess the evolving role of India in U.S. foreign policy, especially in the context of its growing leadership in the Global South?

The process of energizing US-India relations has been gradual, dating back to the Clinton administration, but has always enjoyed a high level of bipartisan support in Washington. Today, US policymakers routinely tout the partnership as among the most consequential geopolitical developments of the current era.

US policymakers working on the India account eagerly pursue an expanded agenda with their counterparts in New Delhi. They tend to perceive India’s role as a “voice of the Global South,” which is a potential point of advantage for India in its competition with China. Washington welcomes New Delhi’s efforts to present an alternative vision and narrative to Beijing’s, especially in instances where the US and Indian concerns overlap. For example, Washington welcomed India’s early and effective critique of China’s Belt and Road Initiative because it highlighted the practical deficiencies of China’s policies in ways that were likely to resonate with Global South audiences.

That said, US policymakers who do not focus on India are generally less aware of Indian claims to Global South leadership. They, like many others around the world, are more familiar with China’s narrative. India still has a lot of ground to make up with these audiences in order to stake its leadership claims.

How do you view India’s current multilateral diplomatic efforts, such as its push for a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council? What impact do you think this could have on the geopolitical dynamics of South Asia and beyond?

The United States has been a vocal supporter of India’s push for a permanent UNSC seat since the Obama administration. US policymakers most committed to the improved functioning of multilateral institutions like the United Nations tend to appreciate that they have failed to keep pace with dramatic changes in the global order and risk becoming permanently irrelevant. It is already clear that the United Nations in general, and the Security Council in particular, is often paralyzed and ineffectual for various reasons, including the deepening geopolitical rifts between the United States and China (and Russia).

From a US perspective, therefore, the question of India’s joining the UN Security Council is tied to broader questions about the utility of the organization and whether any realistic reform measures would enable it to play a more effective role in the future. I, for one, am sceptical. In other words, UN reform may be a necessary step to reinvigorating that multilateral body, but it would probably be an insufficient one. In the unlikely event that the Security Council is expanded to include India, I anticipate it would remain at least as tied in geopolitical knots as it is today if not more so, yielding little practical progress in South Asia or elsewhere.

With India’s significant influence in organizations like BRICS and the G20, how do you see India leveraging these platforms to champion the interests of the Global South, especially in the face of challenges from rising powers like China?

India has a good story to tell the world, including the Global South, about how the “China model” is not the only means to achieve and sustain national progress. India’s pluralism, diversity, and historical experience resonate with many post-colonial societies in ways that make them open to Indian statesmanship in various forums, including the BRICS and G20. Thus, while India is unlikely to outcompete China on pure economic development terms, it does have other ways to assert its leadership.

India is also well-positioned to use its membership in a wide range of international organizations to bridge violent gaps in the global order. It is important to appreciate that India, unlike China or the United States, retains close ties with both Ukraine and Russia, both Iran and Israel. India’s routine participation in forums like the BRICS and G20 enables its diplomats to carry messages across these divides and to begin to establish the conditions for peace. That, in turn, would advantage countries of the Global South which are especially vulnerable to costs from the disruption of global trade flows, especially the increased prices of basic commodities like food and energy.

Your book China’s Western Horizon explores China’s growing influence in South Asia. What do you think are the key strategic implications for India, and how should India navigate its relations with China while maintaining its leadership in the Global South?

China’s Western Horizon explores how China tends to gain influence in neighbouring countries, starting with economic and commercial ties and gradually expanding into politics and security. But the book also emphasizes the extent to which the consequences of China’s policies depend on the choices and interests of its neighbours themselves. In other words, even smaller and less powerful states have a lot of agency in their dealings with China. Their leaders and the public will make decisions that welcome or stymie Chinese initiatives. They tend not to be motivated by any deep affection for China or its aims, but by a need to advance their own agendas by whatever means possible.

The lesson for India is plain: South Asia is far more “vulnerable” to Chinese influence when it lacks better options. The same could be said for most countries of the Global South. India and others, including the United States, would be wise to consider where they are well-placed to offer alternatives to China, such as in technologies (like digital public infrastructure or solar energy), education, public health, security, etc. This does not mean attempting to match China’s policies, especially when it comes to massive loans for infrastructure and other projects, as that would be impractical, and in many cases would mean throwing good money after bad. But competition with China along other fronts is possible and would even be welcomed by smaller states of the world who value having more options and greater autonomy.

How would you characterise the U.S.-India relationship today, especially in light of India’s balancing act between its strategic autonomy and its role as a partner of the West?

As I said above, many in Washington see the US-India partnership as among the most consequential in the current geopolitical climate. Not only is India an Asian counterweight to China, but its size and other attributes complement those of the United States in ways that are attractive to American strategists and businessmen alike.

Where US policymakers tend to struggle is in understanding how India can continue to balance between the West and the rest, and precisely what to make of India’s quest to maintain “strategic autonomy.” Not surprisingly, Americans are typically inclined to perceive the world order as one of US unipolarity challenged by China, and to a lesser extent under threat from a variety of other hostile actors, like Russia. They also highlight new trends, like the eastward shift in global economic power. Many in the United States incorrectly assume that India’s interests should naturally lead it to ever greater alignment with the US and the West. They are frustrated by areas of clear disagreement, such as India’s ties to Russia that have persisted, and in some ways even deepened, after 2022.

The core question is whether the United States and India can simultaneously enhance their cooperation in areas of mutual interest without ever establishing the sort of traditional alliance that Washington has built with its closest partners like the UK or Japan. This would be a new experience for the United States and requires a unique approach, including a sophisticated political strategy for explaining to the American public and their elected leaders in Congress the value of closer cooperation with India even during inevitable instances of serious bilateral disagreement.

India will also need to understand that the choice of strategic autonomy and partnership rather than traditional alliance comes with some costs. Above all, only an alliance presents a firm foundation for cooperation in the most sensitive areas of national security or a guaranteed commitment to mutual defence.

India has forged deep partnerships with countries across Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. How can India further strengthen these alliances to bolster its leadership in the Global South, particularly in areas like trade, technology, and sustainable development?

While it is true that Indians are active in developing markets across the globe, India’s capacity for official diplomacy remains hamstrung by the relatively small size of its foreign service and its limited reach, especially in the Global South. Many areas of cooperation are best advanced by the private sector, but strategic prioritization and breakthrough opportunities often require governments to develop extensive on-ground presence and deep expertise. Outside South Asia, India tends to have less of these capabilities than its competitors, especially China. In addition to expanding the size and capacity of its own foreign service, India could consider ways of coordinating its on-ground activities in third countries with the US and other partners like Japan, Australia, France, and the UK.

In your view, what are the most significant geopolitical and economic challenges facing the Global South today, and how can India, as a rising power, lead in addressing these issues?

The Global South faces what often feels like an inexorably rising tide of Chinese power, threats of major interstate war unseen in generations, and the inability of global institutions to generate solutions to transnational threats like climate change or COVID-19.

India cannot address these challenges alone, but it can help. Above all, as home to 1/6 of the world’s population, what India does to meet the needs of its own people will be its single greatest contribution to global stability, health, and sustainable growth. In addition, as I have explained above, India also presents a counterweight and counterexample to China; appears uniquely positioned as a potential peace facilitator between several of the world’s warring parties; and has an ambition to deliver public goods—like digital public infrastructure and low-cost vaccines—to the Global South in ways that would show leadership and would be widely welcomed.