Despite New Delhi’s immediate focus on the strategic outreach in the Indo-Pacific to buttress its capacity as a Maritime Great Power, it’s true that India will expand its strategic outreach in the Central Asian region as a part of its extending Look West policy.
Though India has got dilemma over its capacity to balance its continental and maritime outreach, it’s true that in an effort to nullify China’s presence in Central and to act as a counterweight to Pakistan, India will reach out more in Central Asia in years to come albeit with tactical and strategic support from Moscow and Washington.
India’s growing strategic interest in Central Asia was highlighted by Prime Minister Modi on the sidelines of the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization last year. China, Russia and four Central Asian countries formed the SCO in 2001 as a countermeasure to limit the influence of the West in the region. India and Pakistan joined in 2017.
SCO Group has become more relevant for Russia and China as their relations with the West have deteriorated. Experts say the group’s potential can’t be underplayed, despite the existence of more prominent regional and multi-national institutions such as forums like the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), the G20 and G7.
The SCO groups around 40% of the world’s population and more than 20% of global GDP. Add Iran’s, and it will control around 20% of the world’s oil reserves. Iran’s inclusion as a full member will boost the SCO’s energy portfolio but it will spark anger in Western capitals. As the SCO is increasingly pitted against Western-led forums, it may get harder for India to strike a diplomatic balance between its different global partners.
To start with, India’s all-weather friend Russia it seems is happy with India’s ambition to link South and Central Asia through Iran excluding Pakistan. India will also take Iran on board for the completion of this project and there will be more push for the linkages of the resources of Central Asia both to Moscow and New Delhi.
In terms of policy, this means that Moscow is ready to take on board New Delhi’s ambition in Central Asia at least in terms of diplomacy and not military which means that its Soft Power is a valuable asset in the hinterlands of Central Asia as an effective counter-measure against Beijing’s increased role there both diplomatically and militarily.
Moscow is aware of the Chinese’s manipulation of the Central Asian Republics through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (where India is at present an observer nation) and bilateral agreements with Central Asian republics, particularly in the energy sector.
India is definitely slow in understanding the strategic importance of Central Asia as it’s more busy concentrating its diplomatic and military efforts on its “Act East Policy” and it understood that it will start “Looking West also”, especially with more focus on Central Asia. It’s done through the Connect Central Asia Project.
It’s here that India’s diplomatic manoeuvring is required as if it can use its good influence on both Russia, Iran and the United States, it can increase its profile in Central Asia at least diplomatically through trade welcomed by Moscow, Tehran and Washington as all the three countries will benefit from that. Second, it will also urge Moscow to support India’s full-
membership into SCO and exclude Pakistan despite prodding from Beijing for Islamabad’s inclusion.
On the other hand, India’s only military base outside its territory is in Central Asia’s Tajikistan namedAyni which if properly defined is in Russia’s own backyard. India is Russia’s all-weather friend and vice-versa and despite that India’s power projection is not welcomed in Moscow.
The reason is obvious as Russia is under increased pressure to check any more multiple-actors with Great Power ambitions in Central Asia where it has established its own unstated Monroe Doctrine.
New Delhi began to work on its own strategic priority, especially in the 1990’s when a forward presence in Central Asia was required facilitated by the emergence of Tajikistan as an independent nation. It was backed by a clear strategic goal to have increased influence in Central Asia keeping in clear view of the fact that an anti-Indian Taliban was gaining ground in Afghanistan with tactic support from Pakistan.
India’s military intelligence established contacts with Tajik counterparts to get more access to the then Northern Alliance to fight out the Taliban all before 9/11. At that point, India was running a military hospital on the Tajik
territory close to the Afghan border to serve the injured Northern Alliance soldiers
Ayni Air Base in Tajikistan happens to be India’s first and only foreign military base since its Independence in 1947. Ayni lacks the classic military operational aspect as it still needs the tick-off from Russia to have India’s fighter aircraft.
It could be argued that despite the inter-service rivalry between the Indian Army and Air Force, the latter’s repeated prodding to contain the Pakistan Army’s presence in Afghanistan and Central Asia was the reason behind India looking to have an Air Force base in Tajikistan though with limited operational capabilities. If the Air Force base has to be operational then it will also have the logistics for sharing intelligence with say Russia and maybe even Iran all that can be first achieved if Tajikistan gives a nod.
In that case, Moscow will try to extend its leverage both on its East and West by not allowing for any increased NATO presence first in Central Asia and so in Eastern Europe.
Therefore, the argument could be extended to how Moscow will allow for India’s increased presence in Central Asia with a military base in Ayni. Further, India will be under pressure on whether to extend itself in the Indo-Pacific region by strengthening its naval presence and joint-warfare capabilities or by giving more teeth to its existing continental warfare-oriented air force combination.
If China wants to play an increased role in Central Asia for its resources with tactic support from Pakistan, then Moscow will not hesitate to allow India’s increased military presence in Central Asia which includes having a base in Ayni by which it can share active intelligence.
In conclusion, much water has flown below the bridge when New Delhi was a reluctant player in the Central Asian region but with Pakistan and China’s influence waning and Russia opting for a greater role of New Delhi in the wider Eurasian region, it’s true that India will find itself in a better position to win the emerging Great Game in Central Asia.
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