ForabriefperiodfollowingtheendoftheColdWar,it appearedplausiblethat militarypower would gradually lose its primacy in international politics. The expansion of multilateral institutions,thedeepeningofeconomicinterdependence,andthegrowingnormativeappealof liberal governance fostered the belief that influence would increasingly be exercised through diplomacy, culture, and rules rather than coercion. Security, it was widely assumed, could be managed throughinstitutional frameworksand cooperative mechanisms, relegating the useof force to the margins of statecraft.
That moment has passed. The contemporary international environment is defined less by convergencethanbyfragmentation:competingpowercentres,contestednorms,anddeclining confidence in the capacity of global institutions to regulate strategic rivalry. In this evolving context, hard power has reasserted itself not as an ideological preference but as a structural necessity. Militarycapability, economiccoercion, anddeterrencecredibility continue to shape how states calculate risk, signal resolve, and safeguard their strategic autonomy.
The return of hard power reflects a deeper reconfiguration of the global order. Geopolitical fragmentation is intensifying, driven by resurgent nationalism, sharpening great-power competition,andpersistentconflictsinregionssuchasEuropeandtheMiddleEast.Asaresult, the post–Cold War emphasis on soft power and institutional governance has steadily eroded. In its place, the material foundations ofpower have regained salience. States are increasingly compelled to relyontangiblecapabilitiesrather than normativeassurances, recalibrating their
strategies for an international system that is less predictable and more openly contested. For countries such as India, this shift necessitates a careful synthesis of traditional diplomatic engagementwithenhanceddefencepreparednessandstrategicassertiveness,aimedatsecuring national interests amid heightened uncertainty.
From a theoretical perspective, this evolution should not be surprising. Classical realist scholarship has long cautioned against assuming that changes in norms or institutions could fundamentally transform the anarchic structure of international politics. Power politics, far frombeingahistoricalaberration,constitutesapersistentfeatureofglobalaffairs.Theabsence of a central authority capable of enforcing rules continues to compel states to prioritise self- help and relative advantage, particularly when confidence in collective restraint weakens.
FragmentationandStrategicUncertainty
Atthesystemiclevel,thepresentinternationalorder ischaracterisedbythediffusionofpower withouttheemergenceofastabilisingequilibrium.Therelativedeclineofunipolardominance has not produced a coherent multipolar framework governed by shared rules. Instead, it has resulted in overlapping spheres of influence, selective adherence to norms, and heightened strategic ambiguity.
Structuralrealismoffersa parsimoniousexplanationfor thiscondition. Inananarchic system, institutions mayfacilitate coordination, but theycannot eliminate uncertaintyor substitutefor material capability. As perceptions of threat intensify, states revert to balancing behaviour, reassessingalliances, forceposture,andstrategicpriorities.Thesedynamicsare visibleacross regions, though they manifest differently depending on historical experience and regional security architectures.
In Europe, renewed emphasis on territorial defence and alliance cohesion reflects concerns overdeterrencecredibilityratherthanideologicalconfrontation. IntheIndo-Pacific, maritime security,technologicalcompetition,andstrategicalignmentdominatedefenceplanning.South Asia, meanwhile, presents a complex deterrence environment shaped by asymmetry, unresolvedpoliticaldisputes,anddomesticconstraints,underscoringhowglobalfragmentation translates into region-specific security dilemmas.
MilitaryCapabilityandStrategicCredibility
Military capability remains the most tangible expression of national power. It underwrites sovereignty, anchors deterrence, and confers credibility upon diplomatic engagement. In an international environment where intentions are increasingly opaque and commitments less reliable, credibility depends less on declaratory policy than on demonstrable capability.
Thisrenewedemphasisonmilitarypowerisnotconfinedtomajorpowers.Middlepowersand states across the Global South are investing in defencemodernisation primarily to preserve strategicautonomy.Formany,militarypreparednessfunctionslessasaninstrumentof
expansion than as a safeguard against coercion, protecting political decision-making space rather than extending influence.
StrategicthinkinginSouthAsiahaslongreflectedthislogic.Militarystrengthhastraditionally beenviewedasinstrumental;valuableinsofarasitenablesindependentdiplomacyandcredible deterrence. The underlying assumption is realist: diplomacy unsupported by power lacks leverage, while power exercised without restraint undermines legitimacy. Effective statecraft lies in managing this balance rather than denying its necessity.
DeterrenceinaMulti-Domain Environment
Deterrence has returned to the centre of contemporary security policy, albeit in a far more complex form than during the Cold War. While nuclear deterrence remains relevant, it now operates alongside conventional, cyber, space, and economic instruments. The strategic environment is no longer definedbystabledyadicrivalry, but bymultipleactors,overlapping domains, and blurred thresholds.
The fundamental logic of deterrence, shaping an adversary’s expectations of cost, remains intact. What has changed is the emphasis on denial, resilience, and escalation management. States seek not only to threaten punishment, but to prevent adversaries from achieving objectives through incremental or ambiguous actions that exploit normative and institutional gaps.
The weakening of arms control regimes and confidence-building mechanisms has further complicated deterrence stability. Inthe absence ofshared interpretive frameworks,the risk of misperception increases. Deterrence, under such conditions, depends as much on political judgement and communication as on material capability.
CoerciveDiplomacyandStrategicSignalling
Between routine diplomacy and open conflict lies a wide spectrum of coercive practices. Military exercises, forward deployments, and limited demonstrations of force increasingly servecommunicativepurposes,signallingresolveandclarifyingredlineswithoutcrossingthe threshold into sustained violence.
In the Indo-Pacific, for instance, maritime patrols and freedom-of-navigation operations functionasinstrumentsofstrategicsignalling.Theirvaluelieslessinimmediatetacticaleffect than in the political messages theyconveyregarding presence, commitment, and limits. Such practices illustrate how military power is employed not solely for combat but as a tool of calibrated influence.
Yet coercive diplomacy remains inherently uncertain. Its effectiveness depends on proportionality, credibility, and accurate assessment of adversary perceptions.Absent shared understandings,evencarefullycalibratedactionsriskmisinterpretation.Consequently,theuse of force short ofwar demands not only capability, but restraint and diplomatic skill.
HardPowerand theLimitsofSoftPower
The resurgence of hard power does not render soft power irrelevant, but it does expose its limitations.Normativeinfluenceandinstitutionalleadershiparemosteffectivewhensupported by credible security capabilities. In contested environments, appeals to rules that lack enforcement capacity often fail to shape outcomes.
Hard and soft power aretherefore best understoodas complementaryrather than substitutive. Material capability establishes the conditions under which norms can matter. From a broader Asian strategic perspective, power remains central not because states seek confrontation, but because influence without leverage is difficult to sustain.
Conclusion
The return of hard power should not be interpreted as a regression to militarism. Rather, it reflects a recalibration of state behaviour in response to a more fragmented and uncertain international system. Military capability, deterrence, and coercive diplomacy have regained prominence because the conditions that once appeared to constrain them have weakened.
Power remains central to international politics, yet its utility is bounded. Strength without restraintisdestabilising;restraintwithoutstrengthisineffective.Inaworldmarkedbystrategic competition and eroding consensus, the challenge for contemporary diplomacy lies not in resisting the return of hard power, but in disciplining it, embedding capability within a framework of prudence, communication, and political judgement.
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