Your early academic work was in French social history, and then you shifted into EU security and defence policy. What was the “moment” or experience that triggered this transformation, and how has that historical consciousness shaped your view of the changing landscape of European defence today?
I was always fascinated by history and by France. The subject of my PhD. – the French socialist Edouard Vaillant – spent the last fifteen years of his life trying to prevent World War I. My research on Vaillant coincided with my own deep involvement in the anti-Vietnam War movement in Paris, where I lived from 1968 to 1976. I came to feel that a proper understanding of international relations was essential for anybody who sought to engage, however marginally, with the course of world events. This led to a fascination with Gaullism and with France’s attempts to forge a defence policy that refused subservience to American hegemony. The onset of the INF crisis (1979-83) crystallised my thinking on European security issues. My approach to my IR scholarship has been deeply influenced by my initial training as a historian. Three main elements reflect this influence: an understanding that key issues of war and peace have not changed fundamentally since the Peloponnesian War; an understanding that alliances are historically contingent and therefore subject to change; a belief that Europe must transcend its historically induced national fissiparousness if it is to exercise influence in a world of multipolarity.
That is why I speak of CSDP as a “work in progress”. CSDP originated in the 1980s in the wake of the INF crisis. It was a continent-wide expression of the need for Europe to transcend its security dependence on the United States. The challenges were multiple. To harmonise the security policy of states with vastly different geographies, histories and security cultures. To pursue strategic autonomy without triggering US abandonment and without undermining NATO. To stabilise an increasingly turbulent neighbourhood, both East and South. To develop both institutional and military capacity that struck an optimal balance between the Union and its member states.
The end of the Cold War presented a context in which such an effort seemed relatively risk-free. Even so, CSDP increasingly morphed into a largely civilian crisis management mechanism focused on the Southern neighbourhood. This was in part driven by the attempt to differentiate CSDP from NATO. But this attempt also highlighted the serious limitations to CSDP’s ambitions as a security actor. From around 2012, I began to argue that the EU should seek greater strategic autonomy via a restructuring of NATO rather than in contradistinction to it.
From the mid-2010s, with growing turbulence in the Eastern neighbourhood, the EU began to aspire to greater military muscularity. With the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it faced an urgent need for both military and geo-strategic credibility. With the re-election of Donald Trump, it faced the prospect of having to ensure regional stability alone.
Over the next decade, the EU must replace the US role as the central pillar of NATO; must develop a grand strategy matching means and objectives; must significantly but selectively increase funding of military capacity; must find a new form of engagement with Russia and new forms of partnership with its Southern neighbours. It is not certain that it will achieve any of these ambitions.
The reason I say this is precisely because the EU has not yet fully grappled with the conundrum of balancing intergovernmentalism with supranationalism. The former has remained dominant while the latter has sought actively to assert itself. CSDP institutions inappropriately mirrored those of NATO – a very different type of institution. In NATO, leadership is unchallenged, and the European member states are, for the most part, explicit followers of US policy. CSDP has no generally recognised or accepted leadership. Decision-shaping in the Political and Security Committee has revealed a complex mix of national sovereignty and supranational socialisation, which I have called “supranational intergovernmentalism”. The result has been a form of lowest common denominator policy.
For South Asia, this pathway should be avoided. Institutional fit and appropriateness are crucial. In retrospect, it was arguably a mistake to situate Europe’s defence ambition institutionally within the EU (which excluded key actors such as Norway and Turkey – and, eventually, the UK) rather than within a significantly revamped Western European Union, whose essential function was as an interlocutor with NATO. Recently, weak governments across the EU, the crisis in Ukraine and the growing urgency of the security agenda have offered the Commission a window for expanding its influence. But the problems identified above remain.
In addition, there is the problem of nationalism. European nationalism, despite the best efforts of the European Commission’s agenda (flags, hymns, “citizenship”), does not exist. It cannot be artificially engineered. Regional regimes around the world (ASEAN, Mercosur, African Union) have tended to model themselves institutionally on the EU. This is not necessarily a wise choice.
For South Asia, a better approach would be to agree on a common grand strategy (or at least a clear strategic agenda) before generating appropriate institutional or military capacity. Only when it becomes clear what can realistically be achieved at the regional level (with what realistic level of means) can decisions be taken on the best path forward. An important element of this is outlined in my answer to question 6.
Another mistake made by the EU was to buy in uncritically to the US approach to regional governance across Eurasia, which paid little heed to the needs and security concerns of other great powers. The (hypocritical) rejection of the notion of “spheres of influence” by Washington has played a part in generating the current crisis.
As the world moves towards multi-polarity, South Asia needs to develop a viable approach to managing that new global order in a way that generates stability rather than instability. This begins with the formulation of a workable, positive sum – relationship with other regional powers. Recognition that the institutional matrix appropriate to trade and investment flows may not be the same as that appropriate to security and defence policy is important.
The EU emerged and thrived as a trading and investment bloc. In that capacity, it was encouraged and appreciated by the US. Its self-perception as a great power led it to embrace military ambitions. This development was seen by the US and by NATO as problematic. The institutional confusion between the two policy areas has produced suboptimal outcomes. A realist approach to lessons for South Asia would suggest that this confusion not be replicated. Different policy areas demand different institutional arrangements.
Finally, there is the issue of nuclear weapons. The attempt to craft a collective defence (CSDP) without clear leadership and without an overall strategy has shown clear limitations. Similarly, the notion of a “European nuclear deterrent”, much in vogue in 2025, poses more problems than it generates solutions. If the nuclear pathway is to be trodden, a more appropriate model might be that of extended deterrence by an existing nuclear power under the French concept of “dissuasion par constat”, or “existential deterrence”.
The current “security architecture” of much of Eurasia is a logical consequence of the West’s mismanagement of the post-Cold War period. Confident that the end of the Cold War represented a “victory” for the US and a “defeat” for the Soviet Union/Russia, successive US presidents have sought to expand NATO (seen as a primary vector of US regional primacy) at the expense of regional stability and cooperation. At the same time, NATO has shied away from any direct (boots on the ground) involvement in the Ukraine war. The result is a catastrophe for Ukraine; an object lesson in ill-thought-through policymaking for both the US and the European powers; the cutting off of relations with Russia, which has become a junior partner to China; and the creation of a new form of Iron Curtain across the continent. There are no winners from this situation. Understanding why is critical.
Instead of pursuing this calamitous path, the West should have sought a new form of security architecture which took into consideration the security concerns of all regional stakeholders. It is still not too late to switch paths and move towards a new regional order for Eurasia, which could then become a model for a viable multilateral global order. The appropriate model for such a post-conflict settlement is not the punitive arrangements of 1919, nor the triumphalist unilateralism of 1945. It is more akin to the comprehensive settlement that emerged in Vienna after the Napoleonic wars. A new “concert of powers” across Eurasia (including India and China) is the longer-term solution to the current dangerous impasse.
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