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Strategic Rivals: India and China’s Parallel Ambitions

by Farshid Keramat - 25 July, 2025, 12:00 1040 Views 0 Comment

China and India share a long history that has lasted for millennia. For much of this time, their relationship has been amicable. The modern relationship between these two nations emerged after the Second World War. India secured independence from British rule in 1947, while the Chinese Communist Party gained control in 1949 following the Chinese Civil War. Since then, the Sino-Indian relationship has fluctuated between cooperation and confrontation.

This article explores the key factors behind the uneasy Sino-Indian relationship in modern times. Shared characteristics such as population size, a growing global influence, and support for a multipolar world order promote diplomatic engagement. Yet the relationship is strained by significant ideological differences, territorial disputes, and incompatible foreign policy objectives. It is argued here that the divergent forces of this relationship outweigh areas of convergence. The result is a gradual deterioration of the relationship that prevents a meaningful strategic partnership.

Strategic Rivalries in the Sino-Indian Relationship

The main challenge to strategic alignment is the ideological divide between the two nations. A point of pride for India is its status as the largest democracy in the world. Its political process is characterised by an active public discourse in a multiparty political system. While democratic deficits exist, India is generally considered a stable and functioning democracy. Its institutions encourage public participation and compromise in public policy formulation.

In contrast, China has a one-party authoritarian form of government that is founded upon communist ideology. The Chinese government is less concerned about public opinion or the political interests of diverse groups. Instead, the government justifies its authority primarily through rapid economic growth and growing global influence. China’s domestic market liberalisation and its extensive global trade network are the foundation of the government’s legitimacy.

The political identities of these two behemoths have shaped their foreign policy strategies. India prefers the foreign policy approach of multilateralism and international collaboration. It has been reluctant to use force, opting instead to resolve conflicts through diplomacy. A notable example is India’s handling of the long-standing border dispute with China. In contrast, China has adopted a goal-oriented and assertive diplomatic approach. For Beijing, international relations are a means to advancing its foreign policy priorities.

The different foreign policy strategies have led to distinct foreign policy objectives. China aims to expand its regional and global influence. In the Himalayas, China has made territorial claims that India views with concern. China’s 1951 annexation of Tibet and its continued political and economic influence in the region illustrate this. These ambitions can be traced back to former Chinese leader Mao Zedong’s “five fingers of Tibet” analogy popularised in the 1940s and 1950s. It views Tibet as the palm and Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh as fingers.

China’s assertiveness extends beyond the Himalayas. In Southeast Asia, it has made sweeping claims over roughly 90 per cent of the South China Sea, drawing widespread international criticism. China has backed these claims by building artificial islands equipped with military capabilities, conducting routine patrols, and dismissing international rulings. Its stated objective of annexing Taiwan is further evidence of an uncompromising foreign policy approach. India has watched these developments with increasing concern. In line with its diplomatic traditions, India continues to favour dialogue over confrontation. While these efforts have sometimes eased tensions, they have failed to address the underlying causes.

“Strategic rivalry persists despite institutional dialogue—India and China tread a delicate diplomatic path.”

Stabilising Factors in the Sino-Indian Relationship

Despite persistent challenges, several factors have helped stabilise the relationship. The rapid economic development in both countries has created common priorities, most notably in the areas of poverty reduction, environmental sustainability, and long-term infrastructure development. These overlapping goals provide a platform for bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

At the 2024 G20 summit in Brazil, both Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping emphasised the importance of global poverty reduction. Within BRICS, a group of ten emerging economies of which both are members, poverty eradication remains a core objective. Environmental issues are also a growing priority, and both nations have engaged in bilateral agreements and global frameworks to address the need for sustainable development and environmental stewardship. The New Development Bank, for example, supports infrastructure initiatives that align with these priorities.

“Shared ambitions and regional influence drive cooperation—but tensions remain deeply embedded.”

At the geopolitical level, both countries support a multipolar world order and have expressed dissatisfaction with Western hegemony. In a 2006 Joint Declaration, they describe themselves as “two major countries in the emerging multi-polar global order” capable of positively influencing the international system.

One clear example of their shared agenda is their support for reform of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). India has consistently called for a stronger representation of the Global South and has campaigned for a permanent seat. In 2024, the Indian ambassador to the United Nations, Parvathaneni Harish, criticised the under-representation of developing nations. While China has not expressly endorsed India’s bid, it has advocated for more inclusion. At the 2024 G20 summit, Foreign Minister Wang Yi called for “boosting the representation of developing countries” on the Council.

Although these overlapping objectives have helped stabilise the relationship, their impact has been limited. Territorial disputes remain a point of contention. The 2020 Galwan Valley clash, which left dozens dead, signalled a sharp escalation. China continues to assert itself both in the Himalayas and in Southeast Asia. The close alliance between China and India’s main regional adversary, Pakistan, further creates mistrust.

The reason for continued tensions is that the shared interests of these two nations are largely aspirational and abstract, while their disputes are immediate and concrete. Poverty alleviation and environmental cooperation generate goodwill but do little to resolve geopolitical divisions. A shared vision for a multipolar world does not necessarily result in foreign policy alignments. China continues to prioritise its own ascendancy, while India’s growing partnership with the United States adds another dimension to their rivalry.

Economic integration has long been part of the Sino-Indian relationship. This, however, has not translated into improved diplomatic relations. India is facing an ever-growing trade deficit with China that has now reached nearly $100 billion. Unsurprisingly, this has raised concerns in India over economic dependence. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) developed by China is also a source of political tensions. While 147 countries have participated in BRI’s infrastructure development opportunities, both India and the United States view the initiative as a vehicle for economic and political influence. Ultimately, the blend of cooperation and rivalry between these two nations has led to a slow but steady erosion of the Sino-Indian relationship.

The Path Forward

Both nations can take steps to better manage their complex relationship. China should consider the political costs of its current foreign policy approach. Any benefits from its territorial and strategic expansion may now be outweighed by significant pushback from the international community. Beijing need not reinvent its foreign policy. A return to Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatic foreign policy approach of the 1980s that focused on stability in foreign relations would substantially improve China’s foreign relations across the board. A permanent solution to the ongoing border disputes and pursuing a more cooperative approach in contested regions are additional ways in which China can achieve further de-escalation with India.

For India, the key lies in realistic engagement. It must recognise that a permanent diplomatic solution to the structural differences with China is unlikely to be accomplished under China’s current leadership. Instead, India should pursue its foreign policy interests with confidence while maintaining a non-violent and strategic posture. It would benefit from deepening its economic and political ties with Himalayan neighbours to pre-empt undue Chinese influence. At the same time, India can embrace its democratic identity and broaden its engagement with other democracies around the world. India should not expect China to prioritise shared values over its clearly stated core interests. When the two countries’ foreign-policy agendas collide, as they inevitably will, China is likely to act in accordance with its own priorities.

Conclusion

India and China share a long history. While they share some similarities in large populations, rapid economic growth, their regional power status, and support for a multipolar global order, these have not been sufficient to overcome their entrenched differences. The ideological divide, ongoing territorial disputes, and conflicting foreign policy priorities continue to undermine the possibility of a strategic partnership. For the relationship to stabilise, China would need to temper its geopolitical ambitions, and India must proactively assert and protect its regional interests through deeper global and regional engagement. In their current form, diplomatic gestures and mutual priorities may keep dialogue alive, but the underlying rivalry remains firmly in place.

Farshid Keramat
Author is a university instructor and global affairs analyst. He teaches political science at the University Canada West in Canada. He holds degrees in political science and law from the University of British Columbia and the University of Sheffield, respectively.
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