Act East Policy: India’s lynchpin towards Eastward Engagement
In the current multipolar world order and ongoing geopolitical strains, there has been a shift in the trajectory of India’s foreign policy towards a more proactive and bolder one. One of its manifestations could be seen in the reinvigoration of India’s eastward engagement with the Southeast Asian region by adopting the Act East Policy in 2014. Recently, it moved to in its 10th year. There is no doubt that India’s Act East policy attempts to inject vigour into India’s economic integration, strategic cooperation and people-to-people/cultural engagement with the countries of the Southeast Asian region[1]. It is based on the four themes: connectivity, commerce, culture and capacity-building. The underlying aspects of Act East Policy are also aimed at a broader approach and engagement with the countries of the Indo-Pacific region, diplomatic and strategic engagement with ASEAN and its related framework like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) etc[2]. Moreover, with the launch of the Indo-Pacific Initiative (IPOI) in 2019, India has added another scope of maritime engagement with like-minded countries of the Indo-Pacific region[3].
India’s willing engagement with this region also stems from the growing India-China competition, especially after the Galwan Valley clash of 2020. China’s growing regional presence and influence, including its activities in the South China Sea and the fear over disruption of freedom of navigation, are some serious concerns of New Delhi[4]. For the first time in July 2023, India’s bold move to recognise the legitimacy of the ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in Hague over the illegitimacy of China’s claims over the South China Sea has come after seven years of ruling in 2016[5]. Moreover, India is trying to take leverage by altering the global balance of power and asserting its global stature.
Major Developments under AEP
Over this past decade, India’s defence and strategic engagement with the ASEAN countries has turned out to be the lynchpin in AEP and Indo-Pacific strategy. India has upgraded its relations with Vietnam, Indonesia and ASEAN to the level of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. The finalisation of the US$ 375 million BrahMos deal between Manila and New Delhi in 2022 and the deliverance of the first batch of BrahMos missiles to the Philippines on 19th April 2024, can be seen as India’s growing defence stature in Southeast Asia. The 7th India-Indonesia Joint Defence Conference Committee Meeting held in New Delhi on 3rd May 2024, also emphasised on continuing their strong defence cooperation[6]. Furthermore, through joint naval exercises such as the CORPAT exercise and hosting of naval officials training programs from Southeast Asia, New Delhi is keen to enhance its maritime cooperation with this region and continue to uphold the importance of the laws enshrined in the United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS, 1982)[7].
On the fronts of infrastructure connectivity projects, both the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway (IMTTH) and the Kaladan Multimodal project have suffered setbacks due to the Covid-19 pandemic and continuing political turmoil in Myanmar since the military coup of February, 2021[8]. The completion of the IMTTH project is critical for extending the road network to Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam and also for the Mekong Ganga Cooperation. Likewise, the bilateral trade between India and ASEAN stood at US$ 122.67 Billion during 2023-24[9].
Challenges, Perceptions and a Way Ahead
However, despite the increase in engagement over the last decade, India has a long way to go before it emerges as the relevant strategic player in this region[10]. One of the major resentments among the ASEAN countries is the lack of robustness in India’s economic tryst in this region. This feeling of lack of confidence on India was reflected in the report of The State of Southeast Asia 2024 Survey[11]. India was ranked ninth in terms of economic, political and security power. The Southeast Asian states have shown little confidence in India’s role in providing global leadership to maintain global rules-based order[12]. On the other hand, The State of Southeast Asia 2023 Survey has expressed comparatively higher confidence in India’s global leadership[13].
The underlying basis of such perceptions towards India stems from inter and intra-regional political dynamics. The region of Southeast Asia is located in the cauldron of the ongoing US-China rivalry, the Taiwan issue and the South China East dispute; which have shaped not only their strategic dilemma but also their perception towards external players[14]. Additionally, the rank of external players’ capability, strategic pursuit and reliability during instability; also acts as a contributing factor. Also, this region is grappling with internal security issues such as the post-coup crisis in Myanmar, defence industrial development, maritime security and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) governance[15]. Hence, the responses from both reports on India’s reliability emerge from the perspective of the effects of power competition and the probability of India emerging as a stable external actor in this region. Although such perceptions are subject to change based on the alteration in regional politics, India cannot take sides with either the US or China explicitly. Such a diplomatic move can come at a heavy cost to strategic autonomy for India. However, despite the resentment and average economic engagement with the Southeast Asian region, India will continue to engage with this region due to its strategic, economic and cultural importance.
References
Bajpee, Chietigj. ‘Reinvigorating India’s “Act East” Policy in an Age of Renewed Power Politics’. The Pacific Review 36, no. 3 (2023): 631–61. https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2022.2110609.
Grossman, Derek. ‘India Is Becoming a Power in Southeast Asia’, 7 July 2023. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/07/07/india-southeast-asia-china-security-strategy-military-geopolitics-vietnam-philippines-indonesia/.
Lin, Joanne. ‘State of Southeast Asia 2024: India’s Strategic Conundrum of Diminished Influence and Rising Ambitions’. FULCRUM, 10 May 2024. https://fulcrum.sg/aseanfocus/state-of-southeast-asia-2024-indias-strategic-conundrum-of-diminished-influence-and-rising-ambitions/.
Liow, Joseph. ‘ASEAN Unity Key to Dealing with East Asia’s Strategic Dilemma | East Asia Forum’, 19 May 2024. https://eastasiaforum.org/2024/05/19/regional-unity-is-key-to-overcoming-southeast-asias-strategic-dilemma/.
Padmanabhan, Keshav. ‘India Ranks Low in Strategic Relevance in Southeast Asia, China Edges out US, Finds Singapore Institute’. ThePrint (blog), 3 April 2024. https://theprint.in/diplomacy/india-ranks-low-in-strategic-relevance-in-southeast-asia-china-edges-out-us-finds-singapore-institute/2025028/.
Padmanabhan, Keshav, and Pia Krishnankutty. ‘India-Myanmar-Thailand Highway — Final Piece of the Puzzle in New Delhi’s Atlantic to Pacific Push’. The Print, 4 April 2024. https://theprint.in/diplomacy/india-myanmar-thailand-highway-final-piece-of-the-puzzle-in-new-delhis-atlantic-to-pacific-push/2027359/.
PIB, Delhi. ‘4th Meeting of ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement Joint Committee’. Ministry of Commerce & Industry, 12 May 2024. https://pib.gov.in/pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=2020351.
———. ‘7th India-Indonesia Joint Defence Cooperation Committee Meeting Held in New Delhi’, 3 May 2024. https://pib.gov.in/pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=2019551.
Saha, Premesha. ‘India Wants Strategic Engagement with Southeast Asia—but How? | The Strategist’. The Strategist, 18 April 2024. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/india-wants-strategic-engagement-with-southeast-asia-but-how/.
Seah, Sharon. ‘State of Southeast Asia Survey 2023: It Takes Three to Tango’. Asialink, 12 October 2023. https://asialink.unimelb.edu.au/insights/state-of-southeast-asia-survey-2023-it-takes-three-to-tango.
Seah, Sharon, and Sanchita Basu Das. ‘ASEAN-India Relations: Time to Match Rhetoric with Actions’. FULCRUM, 13 April 2022. https://fulcrum.sg/asean-india-relations-time-to-match-rhetoric-with-actions/.
Solanki, Viraj. ‘India’s Increased Defence and Security Engagement with Southeast Asia’. IISS, 1 May 2024. https://www.iiss.org/en/online-analysis/online-analysis/2024/04/indias-increased-defence-and-security-engagement-with-southeast-asia/.
Suri, Moksh. ‘Acting East on the Seas: India’s Naval Cooperation with ASEAN’. The Interpreter, 19 July 2023. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/acting-east-seas-india-s-naval-cooperation-asean.
Wadhwa, Amb (Retd) Anil. ‘Distinguished Lectures Details’. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 9 August 2019. https://mea.gov.in/distinguished-lectures-detail.htm?840.
[1] Bajpee, ‘Reinvigorating India’s “Act East” Policy in an Age of Renewed Power Politics’.
[2] Wadhwa, ‘Distinguished Lectures Details’.
[3] Seah and Das, ‘ASEAN-India Relations’.
[4] Solanki, ‘India’s Increased Defence and Security Engagement with Southeast Asia’.
[5] Grossman, ‘India Is Becoming a Power in Southeast Asia’.
[6] PIB, ‘7th India-Indonesia Joint Defence Cooperation Committee Meeting Held in New Delhi’.
[7] Suri, ‘Acting East on the Seas’.
[8] Padmanabhan and Krishnankutty, ‘India-Myanmar-Thailand Highway — Final Piece of the Puzzle in New Delhi’s Atlantic to Pacific Push’.
[9] PIB, ‘4th Meeting of ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement Joint Committee’.
[10] Saha, ‘India Wants Strategic Engagement with Southeast Asia—but How? | The Strategist’.
[11] Lin, ‘State of Southeast Asia 2024’.
[12] Padmanabhan, ‘India Ranks Low in Strategic Relevance in Southeast Asia, China Edges out US, Finds Singapore Institute’.
[13] Seah, ‘State of Southeast Asia Survey 2023’.
[14] Liow, ‘ASEAN Unity Key to Dealing with East Asia’s Strategic Dilemma | East Asia Forum’.
[15] Ibid.
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